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IN RE MARRL4GE OF STENQUIST: EQUAL
PROTECTION FOR THE DISABILITY
PENSION RECIPIENT IN CALIFORNIA
COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW
By Stephen Traverse*
Introduction
Litigation in California over the division of community property
has rarely attained constitutional dimensions.' This is owing partly to
the breadth of the state constitutional provisions governing the Califor-
nia community property system,2 as the broad constitutional founda-
* B.A., 1970, UCLA; M.A., 1971, UCLA; Ph.D., 1980, University of Toronto. Mem-
ber, third year class.
I. The earliest cases relied principally on scholarly sources defining the Mexican-
Spanish community property law and on California statutes restating or modifying that law.
See, e.g., Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525 (1861); Noe v. Card, 14 Cal. 576 (1860); Panaud
v. Jones, I Cal. 488 (185 1). The case law of other community property jurisdictions-espe-
cially that of Texas and Louisiana-was also utilized in the early California cases, although
less authoritatively than the Spanish commentaries or the California statutes. See, e.g.,
Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525; Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308 (1860); Noe v. Card,
14 Cal. 576; Smith v. Smith, 12 Cal. 216 (1859). Constitutional considerations were pivotal
in more of these early cases than in cases today. For example, in George v. Ransom, 15 Cal.
322 (1860), the court held that constitutional guarantees extended to the wife's separate
property and prevented the husband's creditors from subjecting her estate to their claims.
See also Bowman v. Norton, 16 Cal. 213 (1860); Ingoldsby v. Juan, 12 Cal. 564 (1859);
Revalk v. Kraemer, 8 Cal. 66 (1857); Guttmann v. Scannell, 7 Cal. 455 (1857). Most of these
early cases confined constitutional discussion to issues surrounding the protections afforded
the wife's separate property. For more recent examples of community property cases in
which constitutional issues were litigated, see In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546
P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976); Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43
Cal. Rptr. 47 (1965); Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944); Estate of Thornton, I
Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934); Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926); Steinberger v.
Young, 175 Cal. 81, 165 P. 432 (1917); Estate of Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 653 (1908);
Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897). See also note 4 infra.
2. The original provision read as follows: "All property, both real and personal, of the
wife, owned or claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise,
or descent, shall be her separate property; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the
rights of the wife, in relation as well to her separate property, as to that held in common with
her husband. Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife's separate
property." CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 14. After the enactment of a statute "more
clearly defining" the spouses' community property rights--"An act defining the rights of
Husband and Wife," 1850 Cal. Stats. 254-the state constitution was amended to read: "All
property, real and personal, owned by either husband or wife before marriage, and that
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tion of the relevant statutes3 has deflected litigation of constitutional
questions within the community property context and thus forestalled
the application of state and federal constitutional doctrines to commu-
nity property issues.4 It should not be surprising, therefore, that the
California marital property scheme has only recently begun to serve
the goal of "equal justice under law." Only since 1927 has the wife's
interest in community property been defined by statute as "present, ex-
isting and equal" to that of the husband.5 And only since 1975 has the
acquired by either of them afterward by gift, devise, or descent, shall be their separate prop-
erty." CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XX, § 8. This was subsequently amended, on Nov. 3, 1970,
to read simply: "Property owned before marriage or acquired during marriage by gift, will,
or inheritance is separate property." CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 21 (1970). It is notable,
therefore, that apart from the original constitution's passing reference to property "held in
common," the constitutional foundation of California community property law is merely
implicit in the recognition and protection afforded the spouses' (and originally only the
wife's) separate property interests.
3. The relevant statutes are found principally in the Civil Code and the Probate Code.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5104-5136 (West 1970); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 201-206, 650-57
(West Supp. 1979).
4. The outstanding exception involves the doctrine against the retroactive operation of
statutory amendments to the community property law. This doctrine has been applied on
several occasions, see, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 145 P.2d 312 (1944); Estate of
Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934); Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228
(1897). The doctrine has also been affirmed on several grounds, including due process
(Spreckels), the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states (Thornton; Boyd),
and the general state constitutional right to separate property (Thornton; Boyd). Its sound-
ness, however, was questioned by Justice (later Chief Justice) Traynor, in his concurrence in
Boyd, and more recently by Justice Peters in Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d
897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965). The court in In re Marriage of Bouquet. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546
P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976) may have impliedly overruled earlier case law on the
issue of non-retroactivity. Justice Tobriner's majority opinion reasoned that the probable
unconstitutionality of CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1970) (relating to classification of the
spouses' earnings while living separate and apart) before its amendment in 1971 supported
"the conclusion that the Legislature intended the amendment to have retroactive effect." Id.
at 588, 546 P.2d at 1373, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429. See generally Reppy, Retroactivit, ofthe 1975
California Community Property Reforms, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (1975); Note, Retroactive
Application of Caifornia's Community Property Statutes, 18 STAN. L. REV. 514 (1966).
A few early California cases turned on the constitutional guarantee accorded separate
property, especially that of the wife. See, e.g., George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322 (1860); In-
goldsby v. Juan, 12 Cal. 564 (1859); Selover v. American Russian Commercial Co., 7 Cal.
266 (1857).
Finally, constitutional considerations have also been central in California cases involv-
ing conflicts with federal law, where applications of the supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, have takenthe issues out of state control. See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974); In
re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974). See also
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964);
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); and Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), which are
cases where the United States Supreme Court found various state community property laws
partially preempted by federal legislation.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105 (West Supp. 1980) (formerly § 161a): 'The respective inter-
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wife enjoyed, as a matter of legislative grace, rights in the management
and control of community property coextensive with the husband's
rights.6 These most recent constitutionally-inspired renovations of the
community property system, while consistent With the California
Supreme Court's recognition of sex-based classifications as inherently
suspect,7 nevertheless amplify the court's historical silence when asked
to redress marital property grievances having constitutional remedies.
ests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the marriage
relation are present, existing and equal interests. This section shall be construed as defining
the respective interests and rights of husband and wife in community property." The section
was added in 1927, apparently in response to the California Supreme Court's holding in
Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926), that the wife's mere "protected expec-
tancy" in the community property defeated her standing to sue for quiet title to real property
held as community property in her name.
6. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980) (formerly § 172) as amended by 1974
Cal. Stats. 2609, now reads in relevant part: "[E]ither spouse has the management and con-
trol of the community personal property, whether acquired prior to or on or after January 1,
1975, with like power of disposition, other than testamentary, as the spouse has of the sepa-
rate estate of the spouse." CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1980) (formerly § 172a) as
amended by 1974 Cal. Stats. 2610, now reads in relevant part: "[Elither spouse has the
management and control of the community real property, whether acquired prior to or on or
after January 1, 1975, but both spouses either personally or by duly authorized agent, must
join in executing any instrument by which such community real property or any interest
therein is leased for a longer period than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered
... " For an extensive study of the constitutional dimensions of community real property
control and management prior to the 1974 amendments, see Note, Equal Rights and Equal
Protection.- Who Has Management and Control? 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 892 (1973).
7. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
8. Cf. Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926) (holding that the wife's mere
"protected expectancy," in the community property defeated her standing to quiet title to
community real property held in her name); Estate of Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 653 (1908)
(refusing to construe the state constitution as granting the wife a present and vested interest
in the community property so as to exempt her from inheritance tax payments upon her
husband's death).
Although legislative reform of the California community property system has continued
from a relatively early date, progress has not been rapid. Culminating in the enactment of
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980), see note 6 pupra, the statutes only gradually
restricted a husband's originally undisputed right to manage and control the community,
and sometimes even the wife's separate, property. In 1891, CAL. CIV. CODE § 172 (currently
§ 5125) was amended to forbid the husband's disposal of community personal property
without valuable consideration, absent the wife's written consent. In 1901, similar protec-
tion was afforded the wife for community property clothing and home furnishings. In 1917,
an amendment to CAL. CIV. CODE § 172a (currently § 5127) prevented the husband from
conveying or encumbering community real property without the wife's joinder. In 1951,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 171c (currently § 5124) was added, granting the wife exclusive control
and management of her own community property earnings and recoveries for personal in-
jury, but only so long as they were kept separate and distinct from other community prop-
erty and were not invested in real property.
The husband's long-recognized power to control community property moved the legis-
lature to follow another approach in order to protect the wife's otherwise restricted property
interests: reclassification of certain types of property as the wife's property, which was
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Judicial acceptance, over the years, of certain manifest inadequa-
cies in the statutory formulation of the California community property
system may be attributed variously to the conservative nature of prop-
erty law,9 to the judicially-observed separation of powers, 10 or even to
the parties' (or their attorneys') unwillingness to litigate the constitu-
outside the husband's control and management under CAL. CIv. CODE § 162 (1872) (cur-
rently § 5107) and was protected from creditors' claims against the community property
under the California Supreme Court's earlier holding in George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322
(1860). Thus, in 1870, the wife's earnings while living separate and apart from the husband
were made her separate property. See 1869-70 Cal. Stats. 226, later CAL. CIv. CODE § 169
(currently § 5118). Only since 1971 has the husband enjoyed similar property rights. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1970). And in 1889, CAL. CIV. CODE § 164 (currently § 5110)
was amended to provide that real or personal property acquired by a married woman
through a written instrument was presumed to be her separate property. This provision now
applies only to property acquired prior to January 1, 1975, the effective date of amended
CAL. CIv. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1980) giving the wife competitive control and manage-
ment of the community property equal to that of the husband. The prospective application
of amended section 5125 strongly suggests that section 5110, as originally conceived, might
have withstood the strict scrutiny mandated under Sai/'er Inn, if only because both sections
5110 and 5125 had been reciprocally discriminatory--that is, because two constitutional
wrongs had in effect made two (otherwise unconstitutional) rights.
9. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 (1962): "A
thorough understanding of the modem land law is impossible without a knowledge of its
historical background. That law has been a millenium in the making .... The imprint of
the past is still discernible in the present. In this branch of law more than any other we can
time and again invoke the often quoted statement of Mr. Justice Holmes: 'Upon this point a
page of history is worth a volume of logic.'"
The inherent conservatism of California community property law is apparent from its
Mexican-Spanish origins, evidencing a heritage that may be traced ultimately to the
Visigoths, and in written form as far back as 693 A.D. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 3 (2d ed. 1971). It is notable that the earliest Cali-
fornia community property cases relied largely on the Spanish community property system,
looking to the Texas and Louisiana systems, as well as the seminal California statutes, as
correctly restating Spanish community property doctrine. See, e.g., Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal.
488 (1851) and the other cases cited in note 1 supra.
10. The most notorious example is Stewart v. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 P. 197 (1926),
where the court refused to recognize the wife's standing to sue her husband for quiet title to
community real property recorded in her'name. The court held that the marital property
statutes gave the wife only a "protected expectancy" in the community property: "Had the
legislature seen fit to so declare in the language employed by it. . . . no doubt could have
existed as to its intent to work such a radical change in the former and long-established
status as to render the interest of the wife in the community property thereafter to be ac-
quired a present vested estate and interest therein from the date of its acquisition. The
legislature did not do this nor anything like it." Id. at 340, 249 P. at 206.
Another notable example is Estate of Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 653 (1908), where the
court refused to construe the state constitution as granting the wife a present and vested
interest in the community property so as to exempt her from inheritance tax payments upon
her husband's death: "If. . . it never entered the minds of the men constituting the legisla-
tive body that they were imposing this tax upon the community interest of the wife, it caf"
only be said that for their ignorance they, and not the courts, are responsible, and for their
omission they, and not the courts must find the remedy." Id. at 362. 95 P. at 654.
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tional issues." Also relevant is a tendency, subtle but discernible
throughout the history and development of California community
property law, to avoid unnecessary judicial intrusion into intimate rela-
tionships.' 2 These justifications, however, seem insufficient to support
the working of otherwise avoidable injustice in any of the thousands of
dissolution proceedings adjudicated annually in California. 13
A constitutional dilemma is posed, therefore, by the California
Supreme Court's recent holding in In re Marriage of Stenquist14 that a
disability pension might under certain circumstances qualify for classi-
fication as community property: might not classifying a disability pen-
11. The earliest official reports of community property cases, which include summaries
of the attorneys' briefs, only rarely refer to constitutional doctrines. It is notable that al-
though the briefs for Estate of Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 P. 653 (1908), did invoke Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the court rejected these claims without discussion.
12. This attitude is particularly apparent in the rules relating to contractual modifica-
tion of the California community property system. The system has always been subject to
antenuptial and postnuptial contractual modification. Contracts which modify the classifi-
cation provisions require a minimum of proof; indeed, postnuptial contracts modifying clas-
sification of community or separate property need not be written, or even express. See, e.g.,
Tomaier v. Tomaier, 23 Cal. 2d 754, 146 P.2d 905 (1944); Nevins v. Nevins, 129 Cal. App. 2d
150, 276 P.2d 655 (1954). In Woods v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 46 Cal. 2d 697, 299 P.2d
657 (1956), these principles were followed pursuant to the "practice of informality in prop-
erty dealings between husband and wife. . . ." Id. at 702, 299 P.2d at 660.
Most of the cases involve contractual modifications of the classification of community
or separate property; but contracts modifying the spouse's statutory property interests can
also relate to the exploitation and distribution of the community and separate property. In
fact, property settlements occupy a favored position in California law. See, e.g., Adams v.
Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947); Hill v. Hill, 23 Cal. 2d 82, 142 P.2d 417 (1943).
In A4dams, the court went so far as to hold such settlement contracts "binding on the court,"
id. at 624, 177 P.2d at 267, so long as they are free of fraud and duress. Such contracts were
held to survive the death of either of the parties in McClenny v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d
140, 396 P.2d 916, 41 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1964).
Contracts providing for spousal support are given statutory approval in CAL. CIv.
CODE § 4802 (West 1970); so also are contracts for marriage settlements in CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 5134 (West 1970). The latter provision requires that marriage settlement contracts be writ-
ten and recorded. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5135-5136 (West 1970). These statutes regulating
support and settlement contracts impose stricter requirements than do those imposed by the
courts on contracts relating to classification. The different treatment is not entirely referable
to perceived differences between the two types of contracts. For example, in Marvin v. Mar-
vin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), the California Supreme Court
held that support agreements and property settlements between a man and woman living
together in a nonmarital relationship need not be written, or even express. The holding in
Mfarvin suggests that the state's manifest interest in protecting marital institutions, although
sufficient to support legislative regulation of support agreements and property settlements,
does not justify unnecessary judicial intrusion upon the freedom to contract, at least where
parties are not actually married.
13. 49,300 divorces were filed in California in 1960, or 3.1 divorces per 1,000 popula-
tion. By 1975, the figures had risen to 128,500 divorces, or 6.1 divorces per 1,000 population.
See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1977
(98th ed. 1977).
14. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
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sion, which arises from the deprivation of a separate property health
interest, as community rather than separate property, deny disabled
pensioners, in their status as physically handicapped individuals, the
equal protection of the laws? The immediate task of this note will be to
analyze some of the latent constitutional issues in the Stenquist holding
and to suggest some solutions. Specifically, it will be argued that where
the division of post-dissolution disability pension receipts as commu-
nity property interferes with a pensioner's demonstrated need for more
than one-half of such receipts, application of recently articulated stan-
dards of intermediate review to the class of physically handicapped
persons may justify treatment of the pension as the pensioner's separate
property.
A constitutional analysis of Stenquist is timely for two reasons.
First, related property issues have been involved in a number of recent
state as well as United States Supreme Court cases.' 5 Second, such an
analysis seems particularly appropriate in light of continued efforts by
state and federal bodies, both legislative and judicial, to protect the
class of handicapped persons, whose members have long been subject
to social and legal discrimination. This note will further attempt, there-
fore, to focus and expand upon the constitutional significance of these
latter developments.
I. In re Marriage of Stenquist: A Summary
A. The Facts
The husband in Stenquist was a retired serviceman who had been
unmarried when he entered the Army in 1944; six years later, he mar-
ried. In 1953, he suffered a service-related injury requiring the amputa-
tion of his left forearm. At that time, the Army assigned him an 80%
disability rating; thus, had he retired in 1953, he would have been enti-
tled to "retired pay" amounting to 75% of his basic monthly pay at
retirement, computed according to his disability rating and subject to
the qualifications set forth in 10 U.S.C. § 1401.16 Had the husband suf-
fered no injury, or had he chosen not to exercise his disability option,
15. See, e.g., Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d
323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980); In re Marriage of Samuels, 96 Cal. App. 3d 122,
158 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1979); In re Marriage of Pilatti, 96 Cal. App. 3d 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 594
(1979); In re Marriage of Orr, 95 Cal. App. 3d 561, 157 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1979). See also
Gorman v. Gorman, 90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1979), where an attorney was
held liable to his client for failing to assert the latter's community property interest in her
former husband's military retirement benefits.
16. 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1975) provides that no serviceman's retired pay, whether ordinary
or disability-related, shall exceed 75% of his basic monthly pay. Thus, where, as in Sten-
quist, a disability rating exceeds 75%, the excess must be excluded for purposes of computing
the rate of retired pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1979) for the statutory prerequisites to eligibil:
ity for retired pay under the disability formula.
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his maximum retired pay in 1953 would have been only 22 1/2% of his
basic monthly pay;' 7 moreover, his right to ordinary (non-disability)
retired pay would not have vested until 1964, when he would have
completed twenty years of service. ' 8
The husband continued in service until 1970. When he retired, his
right to ordinary retired pay had vested. Owing to his rank and the
length of his service, the husband found himself eligible for an ordi-
nary retirement pension at 65% of his basic monthly pay (which had
risen substantially since 1953) or, at his election, for disability-related
retired pay at the 75% rate.19 Assuming he would desire the greater
amount, the Army began making payments to him pursuant to the dis-
ability option, which payments he accepted for four years.
In 1974, the husband filed for dissolution. The trial court found
that those pension rights attributable to the husband's service before
marriage, or to his disability even if earned during coverture, were clas-
sifiable as his separate property. The court also determined those rights
acquired during marriage which were equivalent to ordinary retire-
ment pension payments (based on longevity and rank) to be divisible as
community property.20 The court concluded that since the husband's
right to ordinary retired pay had already vested in 1970, only such pay-
ments as exceeded those computed at the ordinary rate were clearly
attributable to his disability and therefore classifiable as the husband's
separate property. The pension was thus apportioned, with 77% (the
portion earned during marriage) of 65/75ths (the portion determined to
be equivalent to an ordinary pension) being distributed to the commu-
nity, the remainder to the husband.2'
The husband appealed from the trial court's determination.2 2
While recognizing established doctrine that ordinary military retire-
ment pensions are classifiable as community property, 3 he nevertheless
17. 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1975) requires that non-disability retired pay be computed ac-
cording to a formula whereby the serviceman's basic monthly pay is multiplied by 2.5 times
the number of years which he served. Since the husband in Stenquist had served only nine
years in 1953, his retired pay under the non-disability formula would have been 2.5 x 9, or
22.5% of his basic monthly pay at that time.
18. See 10 U.S.C. § 1293 (1975).
19. See id. § 1401.
20. SeeIn re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779,783-84, 582 P.2d 96, 98-99, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 9, 11-12 (1978).
21. Id. at 784 n.3, 582 P.2d at 99 n.3, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.3.
22. The wife also successfully cross-appealed from the trial court's order limiting its
jurisdiction over spousal support to twenty-four months. See id. at 783, 582 P.2d at 98, 148
Cal. Rptr. at 11.
23. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974). Accord, Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980). But
cf. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (holding that a federally-funded railroad
retirement pension constitutes separate property, where a specific federal statutory scheme
manifests a congressional intent to that effect); In re Marriage of Orr, 95 Cal. App. 3d 561,
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claimed the entire disability pension as his separate property under the
California Supreme Court's earlier holding in In re Marriage of
Jones.2 4 In a six to one decision, however, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's division, holding that because, and to
the extent that, the disability pension served primarily to support the
serviceman and his spouse after the former's retirement, it functioned
similarly to an ordinary retirement pension, 'and as such was divisible
as community property.25 The court noted that to permit the husband,
by unilateral election of a disability pension over ordinary retired pay,
to "'transmute community property into his own separate property' "26
would do injury to the protective philosophy of the community prop-
erty law.2 7 Therefore, the husband's pension rights were to be appor-
tioned between separate property and community property according
to the trial court's formula.28
B. The Majority Opinion
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Tobriner first discussed the
husband's misplaced reliance on In re Marriage of Jones,29 where a
serviceman's right to disability pay, acquired before the vesting of his
right to ordinary retired pay, had been held to be his separate prop-
erty.30 Justice Tobriner pointed out that Jones applied only where the
spouse "has no right to a pension because of longevity of service."3
The Jones holding was subsequently further undermined by the court's
holding in In re Marriage of Brown 32 that "pension rights, whether or
not vested, constituted a property interest; [and] that to the extent that
such rights derive from employment during coverture, they now com-
prise community assets. ' 33 Thus, not only was Jones limited to cases
157 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1979) (lisquierdo requires classification of Veterans Administration dis-
ability benefits as the veteran spouse's separate property, pursuant to a federal statutory
scheme almost identical to the one involved in Hisquierdo). For a further discussion of
Hisquierdo and its implications for California community property law, see notes 118-30
and accompanying text infra.
24. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975). Jones held that a military
disability pension which matures prior to the vesting of rights in an ordinary pension gives
rise to a separate property interest in past dissolution receipts. See notes 29-34 and accom-
panying text infra. But see also notes 66-79 and accompanying text infra, distinguishing
Stenquist from Jones.
25. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 787-88, 582 P.2d 96, 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13-14 (1978).
26. Id. at 782, 582 P.2d at 98, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 11 (quoting In re Marriage of Fithian, 10
Cal. 3d 592, 602, 517 P.2d 449, 456, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 375 (1974)).
27. 21 Cal. 3d at 782, 582 P.2d at 98, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
28. Id. at 782-83, 582 P.2d at 98, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
29. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
30. 21 Cal. 3d at 784, 582 P.2d at 99, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 12 (1978).
31. Id. at 785, 582 P.2d at 99, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
32. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
33. 21 Cal. 3d at 785, 582 P.2d at 100, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13. See In re Marriage of
involving nonvested ordinary retirement pensions, but its holding en-
compassed other nonvested assets as well, possibly making them com-
munity property.34
Justice Tobriner next considered the circumstances under which a
disability pension might serve the function of an ordinary retirement
pension, and so require classification as community property even
where ordinary retirement rights have not yet vested. Reiterating doc-
trine first voiced in Jones, Justice Tobriner noted that disability benefits
serve "primarily to compensate the disabled veteran for 'the loss of
earnings resulting from his compelled premature military retirement
and from diminished ability to compete in the civilian job market'...
and secondarily to compensate him for the personal suffering caused by
the disability." 35 Justice Tobriner, however, further recognized that
such benefits also provide "support for the serviceman and his spouse
after he leaves the service. Moreover, as the veteran approaches normal
retirement age, this latter purpose may become the predominatefunction
served by the "disability'pension.'36
Justice Tobriner noted that the husband in Stenquist did not, in
fact, retire prematurely to face the prospect of competing in the civilian
job market while handicapped, but had retired only after acquiring a
vested right to an ordinary retirement pension, and that his disability
pension receipts began flowing only seventeen years after the date of
injury. In this case the value of the husband's pension depended
largely on his rank at retirement and on the longevity of his service,
and was wholly unrelated to rank or longevity at the time of the in-
jury.37 Justice Tobriner concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances,
the pension's function of compensating the husband for loss of earning
capacity or providing recompense for personal suffering is secondary to
the primary objective of providing retirement support."3 8 The court
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851, 544 P.2d 561, 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1976). Brown over-
ruled an earlier decision, French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941), which had
held that community interests in nonvested retirement pensions were mere expectancies, and
not property interests. In Stenquist, Justice Tobriner noted that when In re Marriage of
Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975) was decided, French was still
good law. Thus, although Jones was expressly limited to cases where disability payments
were received prior to the vesting of ordinary retirement rights, Justice Tobriner declared
that "[lI]anguage in In re Marriage of Jones . .. inconsistent with this opinion is disap-
proved." 21 Cal. 3d at 789 n.l 1, 582 P.2d at 102 n.l 1, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 15 n.1 1. This limited
disapproval of Jones prompted severe criticism from Justice Clark in his dissenting opinion
to Stenquist. Id. at 796-97, 582 P.2d at 107, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (Clark, J., dissenting). See
also note 49 infra.
34. 21 Cal. 3d at 785, 582 P.2d at 100, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
35. Id. at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14 (quoting In re Marriage of Jones, 13
Cal. 3d at 459, 531 P.2d at 421, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 109).
36. 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14 (emphasis added).
37. Id., 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
38. Id.
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thus held the pension to be divisible as community property, following
the court of appeal's formulation in In re Marriage qf Mueller:39
Where the employee spouse elects to receive disability benefits in
lieu of a matured right to retirement benefits, only the net
amount thus received over and above what would have been re-
ceived as retirement benefits constitutes compensation for per-
sonal anguish and loss of earning capacity and is, thus, the
employee spouse's separate property. The amount received in
lieu of matured retirement benefits remains community property
subject to division on dissolution.'
C. The Dissenting Opinion
In his lone dissent, Justice Clark expressed his disapproval of what
he considered to be the majority's establishment of a discriminatory
distinction between disabled employees receiving pensions and healthy
employees who terminated employment prior to the vesting of retire-
ment rights or who continued their employment until death.41 Justice
Clark first noted that, while existing law provided for the classification
of anticipated, nonvested retirement payments as separate or commu-
nity property at the time they became due, under In re Marriage of
Brown42 the employee spouse could not be prevented from changing or
terminating employment, from modifying the terms and conditions of
employment (including those relating to retirement benefits), or from
electing between alternative retirement programs.43 The employee
spouse could therefore determine the nature of the community's retire-
ment benefits.' This and other limitations on the application of com-
munity property principles to pensions suggested to Justice Clark that
pension programs not only compensated for past services, but were also
designed to induce employees to continue in the employer's service by
39. 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977).
40. Id. at 71, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 132, quoted in In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at
788, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
41. "By disapproving Jones, the majority single out the handicapped and compel them
to compensate former spouses for loss of nonvested pension rights due to termination of
employment. The disabled are placed in a worse position than the healthy who terminate
employment. Former spouses of the disabled are given benefits when former spouses of the
healthy are denied similar benefits." 21 Cal. 3d at 798, 582 P.2d at 108, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 21
(Clark, J., dissenting). Butsee id. at 788 n.10, 582 P.2d at 102 n.10, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 15 n.10,
where the majority met Justice Clark's argument: "If instead of comparing a healthy worker
who has forfeited pension rights with a disabled worker receiving a pension, we compare
healthy and disabled workers who are both receiving pensions, we discover that under the
allocation formula set forth in this opinion the disabled worker usually will retain a higher
percentage of the benefits."
42. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
43. 21 Cal. 3d at 793, 582 P.2d at 105, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (Clark, J., dissenting). See In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d at 849-50, 544 P.2d at 568, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
44. 21 Cal. 3d at 793, 582 P.2d at 105, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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promising future subsistence for employees and their dependents.45
Justice Clark argued that the holding in In re Marriage of Jones,46
that military disability payments received after dissolution are the sep-
arate property of the disabled spouse, was derived from doctrine estab-
lishing military disability pensions as comparable to personal injury
awards, and therefore as representing compensation for loss of earning
capacity on the open market, as well as for pain and suffering.47 Fur-
ther, "[b]ecause our decision in Brown determined that vested and
nonvested retirement pensions shall be treated alike, no reason exists to
distinguish our holding in Jones that disability compensation following
dissolution is separate property when a disabled employee possesses
nonvested retirement rights. '48 Thus, he argued, Jones did not need to
be abandoned or even distinguished from Stenquist.49 The Jones for-
45. Id. at 794, 582 P.2d at 105, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (Clark, J., dissenting).
46. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
47. 21 Cal. 3d at 794, 582 P.2d at 105, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 18 (Clark, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 795, 582 P.2d at 106, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
49. Id., 582 P.2d at 106, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 19. Justice Clark assumed that the Stenquist
majority had entirely repudiated the court's holding in In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d
457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975), that post-dissolution receipts deriving from
disability pension rights which mature prior to the vesting of ordinary pension rights consti-
tute separate property. The majority's short caveat in Stenquist, that "[language in In re
Marriage of Jones . ..inconsistent with this opinion is disapproved," 21 Cal. 3d at 789 n.l 1,
582 P.2d at 102 n. 11, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 15 n.l 1, explains very little about its position on this
point. It will be argued below, however, that the facts of Jones are distinguishable from
those of Stenquist, and that the holdings are not essentially incompatible with each other.
See notes 66-79 and accompanying text infra. If the formulation offered below is correct,
Justice Clark's opinion loses much of its force. The majority's failure to limit its holding in
Stenquist to the facts, however, justifies Justice Clark's concern for the physically handi-
capped and makes a summary presentation of his criticism of the court's seeming abandon-
ment of Jones useful.
Justice Clark argued that abandoning Jones was inappropriate for three reasons. He
first noted that the Jones holding was wholly independent of the "expectancy" doctrine, see
note 33 supra, set forth in French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941), and later
rejected in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
The Jones Court did not cite French, or even mention the expectancy doctrine, fully aware
that these both might soon be repudiated. 21 Cal. 3d at 796-97, 582 P.2d at 107, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 20 (Clark, J., dissenting). Instead, Justice Clark contended, Jones was based on the
concept that disability payments are designed primarily to compensate disabled employees
for the loss of separate property concerns. Id. at 796, 582 P.2d at 107, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
Second, Justice Clark argued that the wholesale repudiation of Jones results in an in-
vidious discrimination between disabled employees receiving pensions and healthy ones
who terminate their employment after dissolution, but before rights to an ordinary retire-
ment pension have vested. Id. at 797, 582 P.2d at 107-08, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21. Justice
Clark read the majority's repudiation of Jones as mandating the division of disability pen-
sions even in Jones-type situations, where such pensions matureprior to the vesting of ordi-
nary retirement rights. Id. at 798, 582 P.2d at 108, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 21. Thus, handicapped
persons would be compelled to compensate former spouses for loss of nonvested pension
rights due to termination of employment, whereas healthy persons would not. Id., 582 P.2d
at 107-08, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 21. Further, he argued, disabled persons are put in a worse
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mulation assured a fair result, according to Justice Clark, because no-
tice of that case's holding rendered the non-employee spouse's possible
reliance on a retirement pension unjustified, and because that spouse
was eligible, in any event, for support as necessary.50 In his view, the
majority's approach invidiously discriminated between disabled em-
ployees receiving pensions and healthy employees who either retired
prior to the vesting of retirement benefits or simply continued employ-
ment.5' Thus, Justice Clark would have reversed the trial court's judg-
ment and found the husband's entire disability pension to be his
separate property.5
2
II. Stenquist and the California Community Property Law of
Pensions
A. Retirement Pensions: Ordinary vs. Disability
California case law treats ordinary retirement benefits as deferred
compensation for earned services; like other earnings, therefore, they
are classifiable as community property to the extent earned during cov-
erture.53 The question of whether such benefits constitute community
position than healthy persons where employment is continued after the vesting of ordinary
retirement rights. Where the employee spouse is healthy, employment may continue until
death, in which case no retirement rights will ever mature; since there will be no retirement
benefits to be divided in such cases, the healthy employee will sometimes incur no liability to
the former spouse. But, Justice Clark claimed, "the employee who retires for disability
under today's majority decision immediately must pay part of the disability pension to the
former spouse. The former spouse of the disabled employee is entitled to benefits upon
payment of the disability pension, when had the employee remained healthy the former
spouse might not have been entitled to any benefits and at most could only receive delayed
benefits." Id. at 798, 582 P.2d at 108, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
Justice Clark's third reason for disapproving the apparent wholesale abandonment of In
re Marriage of Jones was based upon the majority's refusal to permit one spouse to unilater-
ally defeat the other spouse's community interest. He argued that the court had misinter-
preted prior case law, and, in particular, had contradicted certain principles expressed in In
re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). See In re
Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 799, 582 P.2d at 109, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 22 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). According to Brown, the employee spouse is free to alter the conditions of, and
even terminate, his or her employment. 15 Cal. 3d at 849-50, 544 P.2d at 568, 126 Cal. Rptr.
at 640. Justice Clark noted that since dissolution does not mandate retirement at the earliest
possible age, continuing employment until death will result in no divisible retirement pay-
ments, and all earnings subsequent to dissolution will be either separate property or the
community property of a new marriage. 21 Cal. 3d at 799-800, 582 P.2d at 109, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 22 (Clark, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 796, 582 P.2d at 107, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
51. Id. at 797, 582 P.2d at 107-08, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
52. Id. at 800, 582 P.2d at 109, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
53. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974);
Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972). Phillipson v. Board of
Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970). Cf. Klench v. Board of
1072
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property is independent of any contractual provision requiring the em-
ployee to contribute to a retirement fund. 4 Moreover, such benefits
may derive from a private or governmental employment relationship,
although a federal policy may require such benefits to be classified as
separate property." After In re Marriage of Brown,56 ordinary rights
need not have vested before a property interest in them will be found.
5 1
Thus, if an employee's marriage is dissolved before he or she becomes
entitled to a retirement pension, the trial court may retain jurisdiction
unitil retirement rights have vested and matured, in order to classify the
pension when receipts begin to flow. 5
8
Disability pensions are treated somewhat differently. As was
pointed out in Stenquist and In re Marriage of Jones,59 disability pen-
sions serve primarily to compensate disabled employees for such essen-
tially personal losses as the loss of earnings resulting from compelled
premature retirement and from a diminished ability to compete in the
job market, as well as the personal suffering caused by the disabling
injury.60 The courts have thus likened disability benefits to personal
injury recoveries in tort.6 1 In California, pursuant to a statute which
became effective January 1, 1980, personal injury recoveries constitute
community property where the cause of action for such recoveries arose
during the marriage, so long as the spouses were not then separated.62
Pension Fund Comm'rs, 79 Cal. App. 171, 249 P. 46 (1926), where the court noted that "[a]
pension is a gratuity only where it is granted for services previously rendered which, at the
time they were rendered, gave rise to no legal obligation . . . . [But where] 'services are
rendered under the pension statute, the pension provisions become a part of the contem-
plated compensation for these services and so in a sense a part of the contract of employ-
ment itself.'" Id. at 185, 249 P. at 50-51 (quoting O'Dea v. Cook, 176 Cal. 659, 169 P. 1176).
54. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974); Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61
(1970).
55. See In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, I11 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974); Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972); Phillipson v.
Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970). The United
States Supreme Court's recent holding in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979),
well illustrates the supervening effect of federal statutes on state community property classi-
fication systems. See notes 118-30 and accompanying text infra.
56. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
57. Id. at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
58. Id. at 849, 544 P.2d at 567-68, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40; In re Marriage of Cavnar,
62 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 270. This procedure seems to have originated from
a suggestion first advanced in Note, Retirement Pay: A Divorce in Time Saved Mine, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1973).
59. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
60. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13;
In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d at 459, 531 P.2d at 421, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
61. See, e.g., -In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d at 462, 531 P.2d at 424, 119 Cal. Rptr.
at 112; In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 70, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129, 132 (1977).
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126 (West Supp. 1980). Prior to the enactment of the new stat-
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By analogy-and following the reasoning in Jones-receipts from a
disability pension are now to be classified as community property
where the disabling injury which gave rise to the disability pension was
suffered while the parties were married and living together.63
B. The Purpose of Disability Pensions
The Stenquist majority's view of the purpose for disability pen-
sions was central to its holding. While recognizing that the primary
purposes were those voiced in Jones, the court nevertheless noted that
disability pensions normally replace ordinary pensions and therefore
might also provide ordinary retirement support for the injured em-
ployee and his or her spouse;6' further, this might become the primary
purpose of the disability pension as the employee approached normal
retirement age.65 Thus, the purpose served by disability pensions var-
ies according to the facts of each case.
1. Stenquist and In re Marriage of Jones
Since the holding of the court in Stenquist depended ultimately on
the fact that the husband retired on his disability pension only after he
had acquired a vested right to an ordinary pension,66 the order of three
events-injury, vesting and retirement-appears to be crucial to any
determination of property interests in disability pensions. Three pos-
ute, personal injury damages were classified as community property where received during
the marriage; post-dissolution receipts were treated as the injured spouse's separate property.
See In re Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975); In re
Marriage of Pinto, 28 Cal. App. 3d 86, 104 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1972).
63. A companion statute to CAL. CIV. CODE § 5126 provides that "... community
property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries
unless the court, after taking into account the economic condition and needs of each party,
the time that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of
action, and all other facts of the case, determines that the interests of justice require another
disposition. In such case, the community property personal injury damages shall be as-
signed to the respective parties in such proportions as the court determines to be just, except
that at least one-half of such damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the inju-
ries. . . ." CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1980). To the extent that the courts con-
tinue to treat disability pensions as comparable to personal injury damages, therefore, such
pensions upon dissolution will normally be assigned to the disabled spouse. But since the
courts are empowered to consider, among other things, "the time that has elapsed since the
recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of action," it is doubtful that the new
statutory scheme mandates a new treatment in future cases having Stenquist-type facts. Fur-
thermore, the courts' practice of offsetting awards of entire community property assets to one
spouse with proportionately greater shares of other community property assets to the other
spouse, see note 112 infra, might be invoked to bring about, in effect, the equal division of a
disability pension, even where circumstances would justify the pensioner's being awarded
the greater share of the pension, or even the whole of it.
64. 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
65. See id., 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
66. See id.
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sibilities are apparent. First, the employee may suffer the disabling in-
jury, and actually retire, before ordinary rights vest. This was the
situation in In re Marriage of Jones,67 where the court held (under the
pre-1980 statute)68 that disability pension payments received after dis-
solution were the injured spouse's separate property. 69 Second, the em-
ployee may suffer the disabling injury before ordinary rights vest, and
retire only after the vesting of those rights, as was the case in In re
Marriage of Stenquist.7° There the court found that "[u]nder these cir-
cumstances, the pension's function of compensating the husband for
loss of earning capacity or providing recompense for personal suffering
is secondary to the primary objective of providing retirement sup-
port."71 Thus, the disability pension may be classified as community
property (and, under the new statute, awarded partly to each spouse)72
to the extent earned during coverture and in an amount equivalent to
the ordinary pension it replaces. Third, vesting of ordinary rights may
precede both injury and subsequent retirement. There are no Califor-
nia cases which deal directly with this situation, but Senquist may con-
trol in view of its apparent approval73 of two Texas cases holding that
disability pensions constitute earned property rights under such cir-
cumstances and are thus classifiable as community property.74
Reliance on Stenquist, however, is perhaps misplaced where injury
and retirement both follow the vesting of ordinary rights. Although the
employee's lost earning capacity might be of merely nominal value (es-
pecially where the employee is injured at a relatively advanced age, or
where retirement had been contemplated only shortly before the disa-
bling injury), the employee's personal suffering might nevertheless be
more evident than in Stenquist-type situations. The Stenquist Court
emphasized, for example, the fact that seventeen years of employment
had elapsed between the husband's injury and his retirement.75 Where
the employee's retirement follows the injury more immediately, as
67. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
68. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
69. 13 Cal. 3d at 464, 531 P.2d at 425, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
70. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
71. Id. at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
72. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
73. See 21 Cal. 3d at 786 n.7, 582 P.2d at 101 n.7, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14 n.7.
74. See Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970). In a 6-3 decision, the Texas
Supreme Court found no distinction between voluntary retirement and disability retirement,
where the husband's right to an ordinary retirement pension had vested prior to his being
ordered to retire from military service due to diabetes and a thyroid condition. The dissent
emphasized that receipts would not accrue until after the divorce judgment had been entered
and that a right to benefits payable in the future is not property. See also Dominey v.
Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) where, under facts similar to those in
Busby, the court held that the payments, although labelled "disability," constituted an
earned property right, and were therefore to be classified as community property. Id. at 474.
75. 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
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within a few weeks or months, his or her personal suffering may be
justifiably accorded greater weight in determining the appropriate clas-
sification than it was in Stenquist. Indeed, the injury may so adversely
affect the employee's life expectancy as to render the disability pen-
sion's purpose of providing both spouses with retirement support virtu-
ally negligible.
Inasmuch as Stenquist is distinguishable on its facts from In re
Marriage of Jones,7 6 the Stenquist majority's limited disapproval of
Jones7 7 is of questionable significance, especially in view of the court's
express limitation of Jones to situations where ordinary pension rights
have not yet vested.78 But while Jones related the classification of disa-
bility pensions to the purposes served by such pensions, it did not at-
tempt to rank those purposes, as did Stenquist, to assist in the pension's
classification. To the extent that future cases will depend upon a deter-
mination of which of several purposes is primarily served by a disabil-
ity pension under the facts of the particular case, Jones may not be
authoritative.79
76. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
77. "Language in In re Marriage of Jones. . . inconsistent with this opinion, is disap-
proved." 21 Cal. 3d at 789 n.ll, 582 P.2d at 102 n.ll, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 15 n.11. See also
notes 33 and 49 supra.
78. See 13 Cal. 3d at 461, 531 P.2d at 423, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
79. It seems of little .importance that Jones was consistent with the now disapproved
"expectancy" doctrine set forth in French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 778, 112 P.2d 235, 237
(1941), overruled by In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633 (1976). See note 33 supra. As Justice Clark pointed out in his Stenquist dissent, Jones
did not rely on or cite French. See In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 796, 582 P.2d at
107, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 20 (Clark, J., dissenting). Further, Jones is consistent with the holding
in In re Marriage ofBrown, that nonvested pension rights constitute property interests divisi-
ble upon maturity. Since Brown did not discuss disability pensions per se, nothing in that
case impedes judicial recognition, following Jones, that the employee spouse's retirement on
a disability pension prior to the vesting of ordinary rights effectively prevents the latter
rights from ever vesting. As was pointed out in Brown, the employee spouse cannot be
prevented from retiring before ordinary retirement rights vest, nor is the other spouse enti-
tled in such a case to compensation for property rights in the ordinary pension which are lost
due to the employee spouse's premature retirement. See 15 Cal. 3d at 849-50, 544 P.2d at
568-69, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 640-41. The fact that disability receipts flow from the employee
spouse's premature retirement for reasons of disability ought not create equitable rights in
those receipts for the other spouse, or even affect the other spouse's property interests, since,
as the court recognized in Stenquist, the primary purpose of the disability pension should be
to compensate the employee spouse for his or her compelled premature retirement, dimin-
ished ability to compete within the job market, and personal suffering. See 21 CaL 3d at
787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14. Such concerns, of course, are personal to the
injured spouse; in Jones-type cases, therefore, the disability pension ought to be awarded
entirely to that spouse. Thus, it appears that Jones is consistent not only with Brown, but
with Stenquist as well.
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2 Stenquist, In re Marriage of Mueller, and In re Marriage of Cavnar
If the principles voiced in Stenquist do not actually violate those
expressed in In re Marriage of Jones,80 they at least find scant support
in two other cases relied on by the Stenquist majority-In re Marriage
of Cavnar81 and In re Marriage of Mueller .-- each of which is distin-
guishable from Stenquist. The husband in: Cavnar had converted his
Teamsters' pension plan from a retirement pension to a more lucrative
disability pension seven months after retirement and thirteen months
before separation from his wife. The court of appeal held that only the
net increase of disability over retirement pension represented compen-
sation for disability-related losses; since "[i]t would be unjust to deprive
wife of a valuable property right simply because a misleading label has
been affixed to husband's pension fund benefits ... "I the court re-
classified the "disability payments" as community property to the ex-
tent that they displaced the original ordinary pension.84
The principal distinction between Cavnar and Stenquist is conspic-
uous: although the husband's retirement pension rights had vested in
both cases before disability receipts began flowing, payments pursuant
to the disability option in Cavnar had been elected only after the em-
ployee spouse had retired. Thus, the distinction is primarily between
"vesting" and "maturity"--a distinction which was also emphasized in
In re Marriage of Brown.8" The significance of this distinction is evi-
80. 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
81. 62 Cal. App. 3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976).
82. 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977).
83. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
84. Id., 133 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
85. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). "In divorce and dissolution
cases. . . the term 'vested' has acquired a special meaning; it refers to a pension right which
is not subject to a condition of forfeiture if the employment relationship terminates before
retirement ...
"As so defined, a vested pension right must be distinguished from a 'matured' or uncon-
ditional right to immediate payment. Depending upon the provisions of the retirement pro-
gram, an employee's right may vest after a term of service even though it does not mature
until he reaches retirement age and elects to retire. Such vested but immature rights are
frequently subject to the condition, among others, that the employee survive until retire-
ment." Id. at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (footnotes omitted), quotedin In re
Marriage of Cavnar, 62 Cal. App. 3d at 663 n.1, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 268 n.l.
Since the husband in Cavnar had retired and was receiving ordinary pension payments
when he exercised his disability option, his rights to the ordinary payments had not only
vested, but had matured as well. Thus, the Cavnar Court determined that "only a portion of
husband's pension benefit payments, though termed 'disability payments,' is properly alloca-
ble to disability." 62 Cal. App. 3d at 665, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 270, quotedin In re Marriage of
Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 786-87, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14. In Stenquist, the
ordinary pension rights, although vested, had not yet matured; under those circumstances, it
is not obvious that the whole disability pension is not "properly allocable to disability." In
light of the distinctions between vesting and maturity which the court had recognized in
Brown, the Stenquist majority's failure to distinguish matured benefits from immature but
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dent from the Cavnar Court's reliance on it.86 Thus, Cavnar held that
although the employee spouse retains the right to select the benefit plan
of his or her choice, where that spouse has retired before electing to
receive disability pay, and has already begun to receive ordinary retire-
ment benefits, only so much of the newly-elected disability pay as ex-
ceeds the amount of ordinary retirement pay is classifiable (under the
old statute) as. separate property. 87
In In re Marriage of Mueller," however, the same court which had
decided Cavnar a year earlier found no legal significance in the fact
that in Cavnar, ordinary retirement receipts preceded disability pension
payments.8 9 There the husband, a serviceman, was eligible upon his
retirement for an ordinary retirement pension at 65% of his basic
monthly pay. He had also been given a 30% disability rating; thus, his
choice was between either the 65% ordinary retirement pension, or dis-
ability benefits at 30% of his basic pay plus ordinary retirement benefits
totalling a mixed disability and ordinary pension at 65% of his basic
pay. Since disability benefits are not subject to federal income tax,90
the husband understandably chose the mixed pension. Upon filing for
dissolution, he successfully sought (under the old statute) classification
of the entire pension as his separate property.9'
The court of appeal reversed the lower court's determination,
holding that the husband's right to a pension had matured on the date
of his retirement,92 and the fact that he had not received ordinary pen-
sion payments prior to the payment of disability benefits (as had the
husband in Cavnar) was of no consequence.93 Reiterating the doctrine
it had voiced earlier in Cavnar, the court concluded that "where the
employee spouse elects to receive disability benefits in lieu of a ma-
tured right to retirement benefits, only the net amount thus received
over and above what would have been received as retirement benefits
vested benefits, and even from nonvested benefits, see 21 Cal. 3d at 788 n.9, 582 P.2d at 101
n.9, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14 n.9, is difficult to account for.
86. See 62 Cal. App. 3d at 664-65, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 269-70.
87. Id. at 665, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 270. Under the new statutes, see notes 62-63 and ac-
companying text supra, excess amounts would retain their community property characteriza-
tion, but would be distributable at dissolution to the employee spouse.
88. 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977).
89. The opinions in both cases were written by Justice Kaufman and concurred in by
Presiding Justice Gardner and Justice McDaniel.
90. See 10 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976); 26 U.S.C. § 104 (1976).
91. See 70 Cal. App. 3d at 69, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
92. Id. at 71, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
93. The court did find it significant, however, that some of the husband's pension was
derived from vested ordinary rights: the "husband is incorrect in characterizing his right to
retirement pay in the case at bench as merely vested. The trial court found husband was
eligible to receive retirement benefits as of. . .the effective date of his disability retirement,
and, in fact, he is receiving some longevity retirement pay as a result of his retirement on
that date." Id. at 71, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
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constitutes compensation for personal anguish and loss of earning ca-
pacity and is, thus, the employee spouse's separate property. The
amount received in lieu of matured retirement benefits remains com-
munity property subject to division on dissolution. ' 94 The trial court
was directed "to determine the net amount after taxes by which the
disability payments exceed the net amount after taxes that would have
been received by virtue of retirement payments. ' 95 It is likely that the
entire pension in Mueller was divided as community property, as it ap-
pears that the net amount receivable as ordinary retirement benefits
exceeded the amount receivable as disability payments.
In looking to Mueller for support, however, the Stenquist Court
ignored the fact that the value of Mr. Mueller's ordinary pension rights
(65%) exceeded that of his disability rights (30%), whereas in Stenquist,
the ordinary rights (65%) were less valuable than the disability rights
(75%). Consequently, an employee in a Mueller-type situation would
have more to gain by retiring after ordinary rights had vested than an
employee in a Stenquist-type situation. Where an injured employee is
capable of working and does in fact continue to work for a short time
until ordinary rights vest, the primary purpose of the pension ulti-
mately received may be to provide retirement support. This will be so
when the facts show, for example, that the injured spouse had planned
before the injury to retire at the moment of vesting, or where the
spouse's injuries were so minor as to justify treating the "disability"
pension as an ordinary retirement pension, notwithstanding the injured
spouse's "disability rating." 96 Thus, under certain circumstances, em-
ployees entitled to disability pensions in amounts less than those of or-
dinary pensions might justifiably be estopped from depriving their non-
employee spouses of community property rights in pension receipts.
But where, as in Senquist, the value of the ordinary pension rights does
not and never can exceed the value of the disability pension rights, or-
dinary pension rights based on longevity of service become effectively
worthless; under these circumstances, retirement support is much less
clearly the primary purpose of pension receipts. In such cases, there-
fore, it is highly questionable whether the non-employee spouse should
be recognized as deserving to share in the post-dissolution pension re-
ceipts. Even partial awards of such receipts to non-employee spouses
probably require a showing, under the new statutes,97 that the em-
ployee spouse's age, disability, and pre-injury retirement plans all mili-
tate against treating the disability pension as anything but an ordinary
retirement pension.
94. Id., 137 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
95. Id. at 72, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
96. Military disability ratings, for example, are computed independently of the service-
man's fitness for service. See note 100 and accompanying text infra.
97. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
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Upon close analysis, therefore, the district court of appears hold-
ings in In re Marriage of Cavnar and In re Marriage of Mueller can be
distinguished from the California Supreme Court's holding in Sten-
quist. Thus, Cavnar and Mueller do not necessarily justify the bald
assertion that disability pensions which mature only after the vesting of
non-disability retirement rights invariably serve a community property
function and so must be divided equally between the spouses upon dis-
solution.
3. Disability Pensions as Compensation for Loss of Employment
Opportunities
In analyzing the purposes served by retirement pensions under va-
rying circumstances, the Stenquist majority failed to recognize that
such pensions may also be designed to induce persons to continue in
the service of their employer.98 Thus, ordinary retirement pensions
serve to compensate healthy employees not only for services rendered,
but for the continuation of those services as well. Such a purpose pre-
supposes the employee's ability to terminate employment at will.
Similar purposes are apparent in disability pensions, especially
where the employee is given the option (as was the husband in Sten-
quist) of continuing service despite his or her disability.99 Just as disa-
bility pay may serve to compensate the disabled employee for lost
earning capacity on the open market, so also may disability pensions
compensate the employee for the loss of his or her ability to leave serv-
ice with any realistic prospects of other employment. In this sense, the
compensation is for a loss of freedom to work elsewhere, and as such is
wholly personal. Notably, the value of this loss (unlike other losses
compensable by disability pensions) does not necessarily diminish with
time, but may actually increase, as for example where the disabled em-
ployee is relatively young at the time of vesting, or where his or her
training proves to be unusually valuable to other potential employers
but for the disability. Particularly in the case of a disabled serviceman,
the lost ability to leave military service will be even more keenly felt as
more lucrative prospects of employment in the civil sector become in-
creasingly remote.
98. See Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 472-73, 492 P.2d 13, 21, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 333
(1972); Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 49, 473 P.2d 765, 776, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 61, 72 (1970); Bellus v. City of Eureka, 69 Cal. 2d 336, 351, 444 P.2d 711,720, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 144 (1968). But cf. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 599, 517 P.2d 449,
453, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (1974), quoted in text accompanying note 115 infra, where the
California Supreme Court refused to conclude that the classification of an ordinary military
retirement pension as community property constituted a disincentive to continued service.
99. See note 100 and accompanying text infra.
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C. Overriding Federal Policies
L The Stenquist Pension
The disability pension's function of compensating injured service-
men for lost civilian employment opportunities comports with case law
which establishes that mere disability does not mandate retirement
from military service; in fact, disability ratings are wholly independent
of fitness for military service.o Thus, disabled military employees not
wholly unfit for service are given the option of retiring on disability
pay, or of continuing service until they become unfit for military duty
or are unwilling to continue service. At that time they are retired on
the higher of disability pay or ordinary retired pay,' 0 ' and in neither
case will they lose the tax benefits of their disability pay.' °2 Since the
amount of retired pay in such instances may depend not only on rank
and longevity but may also require consideration of the serviceman's
disability rating, and since the tax benefits of the disability pension are
not lost where the serviceman chooses a more lucrative ordinary pen-
sion, federal policy would suggest that the principal purpose of the dis-
abled serviceman's retirement pension, even where the serviceman
continues service after his injury, is not to provide the serviceman with
retirement support, but rather to compensate him for lost employment
opportunities in the civil sector.'0" The pension is based on the service-
man's monthly pay at the time of retirement, not at the time of injury;
thus, just as the value of the disabled serviceman's lost civilian employ-
ment opportunities increases over time, so also does the value of the
pension that he ultimately receives increase.
It is scarcely surprising that the husband in Stenquist did not retire
immediately after his injury; evidently, he had been adjudged fit to
continue military service, fitness for service being independent of disa-
bility under federal law. Nor is it particularly surprising that military
100. See Albert T. Watson, 152 Ct. Cl. 273, 280 (1961): "Congress provided that the
percentage of disability should be determined 'in accordance with the standard schedule of
rating disabilities. . .' [quoting 37 U.S.C. § 272(d) (1952)]. That schedule is written without
regard to one's percentage of disability for military service. As to that, there are no percent-
ages. One is either fit, or unfit. If he is unfit, the slight percentage of his unfitness will not
keep him in the service." The converse also is true: if he is fit, the slightest percentage of his
fitness will not keep him out of the service. See also Ray Myers, 416 F.2d 1302, 1305 (1969):
"[Ihe Veterans Administration Schedule for Rating Disabilities has no application to deter-
mination of fitness or unfitness for duty; it applies only to rating of disabilities."
101. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976). Cf. In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66,
137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977), where the husband's 30% disability rating did not prevent his
receiving a pension totalling 65% of his basic monthly pay, pursuant to his ordinary retire-
ment rights. This aspect of Mueller is discussed in the text accompanying note 90 supra.
102. Cf. In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977) (hus-
band electing mixed disability and ordinary retirement pension would not be taxed on the
disability portion).
103. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401.
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disability pensions are evaluated according to the serviceman's rank at
retirement (a function of longevity of service) and not according to his
rank or length of service at the time of injury, since such pensions rep-
resent compensation primarily for lost civilian employment opportuni-
ties, whose value increases with time. In these particulars, the decision
in Stenquist is at odds with established federal policy regarding mili-
tary disability pensions, since it fails to take into account the essentially
separate property functions that such pensions may serve. The pen-
sion's exemption from federal income tax is further evidence of the
possible inconsistency between federal policy and current state policy
regarding military disability pensions. Thus, Stenquist's treatment of
military disability pensions may present difficulties under the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution."°
2 Federal Supremacy in California Community Property Law
The United States Supreme Court first applied the supremacy
clause to a California community property case in Wfissner v. Wiss-
ner, 0 where it held that the wife's claims, under California commu-
104. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or Ahich shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." The scope and protective purpose of the supremacy
clause was defined by Chief Justice Marshall quite early in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1 (1824): "Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating their own purely
internal affairs, whether of trading or police, the States may sometimes enact laws, the valid-
ity of which depends on their interfering with, and being contrary to, an act of Congress
passed in pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the
laws of New York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in their applica-
tion to this case, come into collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right
to which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those
laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations
and among the several States,' or, in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and
police. In one case and the other, the acts of New York must yield to the law of Congress;
and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer, against a right given by a law of the
Union, must be erroneous.
: ' . The nullity of any act, inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the decla-
ration, that the constitution is the supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of
the clause which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State
Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, though enacted in the execution of ac-
knowledged State powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in
pursuance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the authority of the United States.
In every such case, the act of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it." Id. at 209-11.
105. 338 U.S. 655 (1950). Cf. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 664-71 (1962), where the
Court held that by virtue of the supremacy clause, Treasury Regulations creating a right of
survivorship in United States Savings Bonds registered in co-ownership form preempt any
inconsistent provisions of the Texas community property law.
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nity property law, to one-half the proceeds of a National Service Life
Insurance policy must fail as frustrating Congress' deliberate intention
to allow servicemen to choose their policy's beneficiary and to deny all
other persons vested rights in the proceeds. 106 The Court determined
that "[a] liberal policy toward the serviceman and his named benefici-
ary is everywhere evident in the comprehensive statutory plan."'' 07 The
Court noted that Congress explicitly allowed the serviceman to control
disbursement of the proceeds and exempted such proceeds from seizure
by any legal or equitable process.'10 Citing McCulloch v. Maryland,0 9
the Court further noted that the validity of federal statutes depends on
whether they further ends legitimately within congressional powers." 0
The statute in Wissner was found to be a proper enactment under Con-
gress' power to legislate in the interest of the national defense."' Since
this statute conflicted with certain California community property pro-
visions, the latter were held preempted by the federal legislation.12
Although Stenquist did not reach the issue of frustration of con-
gressional intent, the California Supreme Court did distinguish Wis-
ner in In re Marriage of Fithian,I " which held that the classification of
a serviceman's ordinary retired pay as community property, to the ex-
106. See 338 U.S. at 661 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 802(i) (currently 38 U.S.C. § 716(d) (1976)).
107. 338 U.S. at 658. The Court specifically noted that "[p]remiums are very low and are
waived during the insured's disability; costs of administration are borne by the United
States; liabilities may be discharged out of congressional appropriations." Id.
108. See id. at 658-59 (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 802(g), 454a (currently 38 U.S.C. § 717(a),
3101(a)). Where federal law provides that a pension is exempt from seizure by legal or
equitable process, the pension must be allocated as the pensioner's separate property. See
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (railroad retirement pension), In re Marriage
of Orr, 95 Cal. App. 3d 561, 157 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1979) (Veterans Administration benefits).
Cf. Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1980), where the classifi-
cation of ordinary military retirement pensions was noted as being governed by state law
alone, since such pensions are not covered by any Hisquierdo-type statutory scheme mani-
festing a congressional intent to preempt.
109. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
110. 338 U.S. at 660-61.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 661. But see id. at 661-64 (Minton, J., dissenting) where Justice Minton noted
that part of the husband's policy was purchased with the proceeds of the sale of the wife's
property, and that Congress could not have intended that the wife in such circumstances be
defrauded. Until Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), the California courts
avoided any possibility of fraud in instances of this sort by awarding the nonemployee
spouse a proportionately greater share of the other community assets. See, e.g., In re Mar-
riage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974). In 1lisquierdo, the
Supreme Court ruled that applying this practice to federal railroad retirement benefits
"would improperly anticipate payment by allowing [the nonemployee spouse] to receive [his
or] her interest before the date Congress has set for any interest to accrue.
"Any such anticipation threatens harm to the employee, and corresponding frustration
to federal policy, over and above the mere loss of wealth caused by the offset." 439 U.S. at
589.
113. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
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tent earned during coverture, does not interfere with the accomplish-
ment of Congress' goals in creating the current military retirement
scheme. 1 4 The Court noted that:
[t]here is considerable evidence that Congress enacted the federal
military retirement pay system in order to bolster the morale of
the serviceman and to provide him with an incentive to remain in
the armed.services, as well as to afford him material protection in
his later years. It does not follow therefrom that applying com-
munity property law to retirement pay creates a disincentive to
establishing a career in the military, or detracts from a service-
man's spirit or future security.1 5
But this distinction may be invalid where the military retirement bene-
fits are disability-related, as in Stenquist, since a disabled serviceman
(just like any other disabled employee) will often have extraordinary
medical, emotional and other needs. Where such needs are clearly
demonstrated, the disabled serviceman's morale and future security
may indeed be jeopardized by dividing post-dissolution disability pen-
sion receipts equally between the spouses once ordinary retirement
rights have vested. Although current state policy on this matter is not
likely to interfere with the establishment of military careers, it is not
inconceivable that disabled servicemen residing in California, once
they have become disabled, frequently will prefer to retire before their
ordinary retirement rights vest, so as to maximize their equitable enti-
tlement, under the fiew statutes,' 1 6 to post-dissolution pension receipts.
Under such circumstances, the California community property law will
constitute a disincentive to continued service, and to that extent will be
at odds with federal policy. Moreover, the federal policy which applies
special tax provisions only to disability-related military benefits, even
where supplemented by ordinary benefits, 1 7 would support an infer-
ence that such disability benefits were intended as personal to the dis-
abled serviceman, and so must be awarded entirely to him at
dissolution.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed a related
question in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,1 8 which held that retirement
benefits payable under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974" 9 may not
be divided as community property. To reach this result, the Court re-
lied on specific statutes manifesting a congressional intent that such
benefits be treated as the employee spouse's separate property. First,
annuities payable under the Act are declared exempt from "garnish-
114. See 1d. at 597-99, 517 P.2d at 452-53, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
115. Id. at 599, 517 P.2d at 453, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
116. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
117. See 10 U.S.C. § 1403 (1976). See also note 102 and accompanying text supra.
118. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
119. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-23 It (1976).
ment, attachment, or other legal process."' 12 0 Second, according to a
1975 addition to the Social Security Act,12 ' "moneys. . . due from, or
payable by, the United States . . to any individual, including mem-
bers of the armed services, shall be subject, . . . to legal process
brought for the enforcement, . . . of. . . legal obligations to provide
child support or make alimonypayments."' 22 Finally, a 1977 statute re-
lating to the 1975 statute defines "alimony" as not including "any pay-
ment or transfer of property or its value by an individual to his spouse
or former spouse in compliance with any community property settle-
ment, . . . or other division of property between spouses or former
spouses."' 123 Interpreting and applying these statutes as a single statu-
tory scheme, the Court held that under the supremacy clause state com-
munity property provisions must yield to a conflicting congressional
intent that retirement annuities payable under the Railroad Retirement
Act be allocated entirely to the employee, not to his or her spouse.'
The probable effect of Hisquierdo on California community prop-
erty jurisprudence is difficult to predict. But absent future legislation
modifying current statutory language, the holding of Hisquierdo is
likely to be read very narrowly by the California courts, as affecting
only those federal pensions exempt from "garnishment, attachment, or
other legal process" by federal statute.125 These would include not only
railroad retirement benefits, but social security benefits 26 and Veterans
Administration benefits' 27 payable under the Veterans Benefits Act
28
as well. No similar statute affects either ordinary or disability-related
military retired pay. 129
Thus, unless a federal statute exempts a particular pension from
"garnishment, attachment, or other legal process," it is unlikely that the
1975 and 1977 additions to the Social Security Act may be invoked by
employee spouses in California to insulate their pensions from the
community property laws. Future adjudications over ordinary or disa-
bility-related military retired pay will therefore by unaffected by the
Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo, and will instead continue to
120. Id. § 231(m).
121. Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 2357, as
amended by Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, Title V,
§ 501(a), (b), 91 Stat. 157 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. 111978)).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 659 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added).
123. Id. § 662(c) (1976 & Supp. 111978).
124. 439 U.S. at 590-91.
125. See note 120 and accompanying text supra.
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
127. See 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1976).
128. Id.
129. Military retirement annuities, however, payable in lieu of and in lesser amounts
than "retired pay," would appear to be the employee spouse's separate property under His-
quierdo. See 10 U.S.C. § 1440 (1976).
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be controlled, in California, by Stenquist.'30
D. Stenquist: Effects as Limitations
As argued above, the personal nature of the employee spouse's in-
terest in a disability pension does not diminish through time where
such a pension is seen as compensating the injured employee for lost
employment opportunities and for the related loss of freedom to leave
current employment.'31 Since this purpose is apparent from the federal
law regulating military disability pensions, 132 the Court's focus in Sten-
quist on the moment of vesting seems misconceived. The holding in
Stenquist, that the community's interest in a disability pension vests
concurrently with the right to ordinary retirement benefits, means that
the non-employee spouse is immediately entitled to a substantial por-
tion of the pension. This will often produce an equitable result, but not
always.
1. Distinguishable Facts
For example, where the employee spouse's disability is so severe as
to require special medical care, an award of one-half the pension pro-
ceeds to the non-employee spouse may render the injured spouse un-
able to meet his or her disability-related expenses. This state of affairs
is not inconceivable even in a Stenquist-type situation, where the hus-
band continued active military service for seventeen years following his
injury; some disability-related afflictions manifest themselves only later
in life, and the effects of many injuries worsen steadily over time.
Moreover, the expense of meeting disability-related needs increases
progressively; thus, although recourse to the entire pension may not be
necessary at first, the pension may be inadequate to cover medical and
incidental expenses as the years pass, even if the injured spouse's physi-
cal condition remains relatively stable. " Finally, where the employee
spouse's injury occurs only shortly before ordinary rights vest and that
130. The California Supreme Court so held recently in Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323,
328 n.3, 605 P.2d 10, 12 n.3, 161 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 n.3 (1980) (citing Gorman v. Gorman,
90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 462, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479, 483 (1979)). Hisquierdo was held inapplicable
to federal civil service pensions in In re Marriage of Samuels, 96 Cal. App. 3d 122, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 38 (1979). Pensions regulated under the Federal Employees Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) were held unaffected by Hisquierdo in In re Marriage of Pilatti, 96 Cal.
App. 3d 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1979). Federal civil service disability benefits and all disa-
bility pensions regulated by ERISA would thus appear to be subject to the principles enunci-
ated in Stenquist. Of course, these principles would also apply to state and private pensions
receivable by California domiciliaries.
131. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
132. See notes 100-03 and accompanying text supra.
133. To a certain extent, these expensei will be neutralized by the cost-of-living increases
mandated by 10 U.S.C. § 104a (Supp. 1978). Even so, special medical costs may increase at
a more rapid rate than the routine costs contemplated by the statute.
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spouse retires soon after vesting, the relative lack of time between in-
jury and retirement-especially when compared with the seventeen-
year lapse in Stenquist-suggests that the disability pension would
probably be used to protect concerns entirely personal to the disabled
spouse. By focusing on the moment of vesting, Stenquist, if read
broadly enough, would foreclose consideration of those concerns.
134
Unswerving adherence to the Stenquist formulation may also visit
injustice upon the nonemployee spouse. If, for example, the injured
employee spouse retires only shortly before vesting, any post-dissolu-
tion disability benefits to which he or she may be entitled might be
allocable--even under the new statutes135-to the employee spouse.
Thus, the employee spouse might "by invoking a condition wholly
within his control, defeat the community interest of the other
spouse,"136 even where the employee spouse has no particular need for
the entire disability pension. Such a result would be constitutionally
tolerable, however, only where no overriding federal law impedes divi-
sion of the pension as community property. 137
2. The Vesting of Ordinary Retirement Rights
It is uncertain why the Stenquist majority conferred legal signifi-
cance upon the moment of vesting. Disability pensions may serve pri-
marily to provide retirement support, but only when the employee
spouse continues working after his or her injury, a substantial period of
time separates the moment of injury from the moment ordinary retire-
ment rights vest, and the employee spouse does not need the pension to
meet disability-related expenses-all conditions present in Stenquist.
Further, the shift in purpose from compensation for entirely personal
concerns to provision of retirement support is properly viewed-as grad-
ual, not sudden, since it depends on the development of a number of
different factors. The nonemployee spouse's interest in the disability
pension should perhaps be recognized as being acquired gradually, ac-
cording to a sliding scale whereby the employee spouse's personal enti-
tlements diminish with time and the community's entitlements
increase. Under such a scheme, the moment of vesting might mark the
time when the employee spouse's sole entitlements reach their maxi-
mum and the non-employee spouse's community entitlements reach
134. For instance, the Stenquist majority relied on-in fact found "indistinguishable"--
In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977), which involved
such a set of facts. See.n re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 786-89, 582 P.2d at 100-03,
148 Cal. Rptr. 9, 13-16. Justice Clark, dissenting, suggested that Mueller should be repudi-
ated. Id. at 800 n.5, 582 P.2d at 109 n.5, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 22 n.5 (Clark, J., dissenting).
135. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra. These statutes do not specifically
refer to disability pensions, which might therefore continue to be controlled by Stenquist.
136. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 786, 582 P.2d at 100, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
137. See notes 105-130 and accompanying text supra.
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their minimum.' 38  This approach offers substantial justice to both
spouses and remains consistent with the principles voiced in Sten-
quist.1
3 9
138. Applying such a sliding scale to the facts in Stenquist, 6/26ths of the pension, repre-
senting the portion earned prior to marriage, is clearly separate property, and 3/26ths, repre-
senting the portion earned between the marriage date and the time of injury, is clearly
community property. Allocability of the remaining 17/26ths would change character from
year to year, according to a "depreciation" system whereby the employee spouse's sole inter-
ests in all non-matured disability payments gradually decreases from the date of injury to
the date on which ordinary retirement rights vest. Thus, in 1953 (the year of the husband's
injury) all non-matured rights in the husband's disability pension would be awarded to him
alone; that is, if the husband had retired in 1953 the entire portion of his pension in excess of
what had already been awarded-in this case, nothing-would be awarded to him alone,
leaving the husband with 6/9ths separate property and 3/9ths community property. In
1954, the unclassified excess would begin to be depreciated over the eleven-year period pre-
ceding the vesting of ordinary rights. Thus, if the husband had retired in 1954, 6/10ths of
his pension would be allocable to him alone, 3/10ths would be allocable to the community,
and 10/1 lths of the remaining 1/10th would be awarded to the husband, and 1/11th of the
remaining 1/10th would be awarded to the community. This process would continue until
1964, when the husband's ordinary retirement rights would vest. Had Mr. Stenquist retired
in that year, 6/20ths of his receipts would have been awarded, under our formula, to him
outright; 3/20ths would have been allocated to the community; and the whole of the remain-
ing 11/20ths would also have been awarded to the community. If the husband continued
working after the moment of vesting, subsequent receipts attributable to this period would
have been awarded entirely to the community. By this formula, the wife's one-half commu-
nity property interest is 38.5% (that is 1/2 of 20/26ths); the husband's interest is 61.5%. Such
a distribution would take into account the gradually changing purpose served by a disability
pension. Cf. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1014-5, 1.1015-1(b) (1980), where the uniform basis in a life
estate and remainder is shared by the life tenant and remainderman in shifting percentages,
according to the changing value of each party's interest in the subject matter.
Of course, the formula suggested above (and any other formula as well) would be sub-
ject to modification upon a showing of special need by the injured employee spouse due to
his or her disability, according to California case law. See note 140 and accompanying text
infra-
139. Other formulas are also possible. For example, if the husband in Stenquit had
retired in 1964 rather than in 1970 he would have enjoyed no vested right to ordinary retire-
ment benefits; therefore, his disability pay would have been separate property under In re
Marriage of Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975). Since ordinary
retirement rights vested in 1964, and the husband retired six years later following twenty-six
years in service, the court might have apportioned the pension as 20/26ths separate property
and 6/26ths community property. Although non-vested rights do represent a property inter-
est, under In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976),
this rule may pertain only to non-vested rights in ordinary retirement pensions. Even if it
applies to other types of pensions, including the pension in Senquist, the purpose of the rule
protecting non-vested rights is to assure the nonemployee spouse a portion of the receipts
from rights which vest subsequently to the division of the community property. Since all of
the rights in Stenquist had vested prior to dissolution, Brown should not prevent the
20/26ths and 6/26ths division.
If the employee spouse is considered as being compensated for a loss of freedom to
change jobs, his or her award at dissolution might also be calculated according to how long
this freedom was denied. Such a formula would not consider the employee's years of service
while single since no freedom would have been denied during those years. Under this
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The Stenquist Court's emphasis on the moment of vesting affected
not only its holding that the wife retained a property interest in the
husband's disability pension, but also its approval of the trial court's
formula determining the value of that interest. California case law pro-
vides that in apportioning community and separate property the
formula to be applied is the one best calculated to do substantial jus-
tice, according to the circumstances of the case, based on all of the evi-
dence before the court.'40  Since the Stenquist formula creates a
community property interest in the disability pension from the moment
ordinary retirement rights vest, the fact that that interest had been ac-
cumulated only gradually was entirely ignored. Even under the new
statutes, 41 this may be significant in certain cases factually distinguish-
able from Stenquist, especially where application of the Stenquist
formula may not promote "the interests of justice."' 142 For example,
where the employee spouse's disability is so great that the value of any
vested ordinary retirement right is practically negligible (as in Sten-
quist), and where no substantial period of time elapses between injury
and vesting (as in In re Marriage of Mueller), 14 the entire disability
pension may serve primarily to compensate the injured spouse for his
or her personal suffering. Under these circumstances, a formula grant-
ing the nonemployee spouse an amount equivalent to one-half of the
vested but ineffective ordinary retirement pension, to the extent attribu-
table to earnings during coverture, would not accurately reflect the pen-
sion's purpose.
The Stenquist formula doubtlessly is appropriate in a case such as
In re Marriage of Cavnar,'" where ordinary retirement benefits were
already flowing when the husband instead elected a more lucrative dis-
ability pension. The husband was properly prevented from defrauding
his wife of a matured property interest. The Stenquist formulation
might also be appropriate under Stenquist's facts, but only if the hus-
band's disability was not so great as to entitle him in fairness to the
portion that was ultimately awarded to the wife, and if some reason can
formula, Mr. Stenquist was denied the freedom to change jobs for seventeen years, since he
presumably never recovered from his disability; thus the whole of the pension would be
awarded to him alone. Application of this formula would always result in the entire pension
being awarded to the employee spouse, unless that spouse recovers from the disabling in-
jury.
140. See Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967);
Estate of Neilson, 57 Cal. 2d 733, 371 P.2d 745, 22 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962); Gilmore v. Gilmore,
45 Cal. 2d 142, 287 P.2d 769 (1955); Estate of Gold, 170 Cal. 621, 151 P. 12 (1915); Pereira v.
Pereira, 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488 (1909); Tassi v. Tassi, 160 Cal. App. 2d 680, 325 P.2d 872
(1958).
141. See notes 62-63 & 135 and accompanying texts supra.
142. CAL. Cry. CODE § 4800(c), quoted in note 63 supra.
143. 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977).
144. 62 Cal. App. 3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976).
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be found, under the circumstances of the case, for attaching particular
importance to the moment of vesting as marking the end of all separate
property interests and the beginning of all community property inter-
ests in the pension.
By failing to explain the significance of the moment of vesting, the
Stenquist majority did not evaluate certain factors which may have
been present in that case and which might have an impact on future
litigation. 5 For instance, the court never expressly considered
whether the husband might reasonably have been expected to find
comparable non-military employment in 1953, when his injury oc-
curred, or at any time thereafter. If not, his immediate retirement after
only nine years of service on a disability pension of 75% of his basic
monthly pay cannot be considered an option comparable to continued
service. As he grew older, his age alone might have constituted a bar-
rier to civilian employment, irrespective of his handicapped status; but
the husband's disability surely exacerbated the effect of aging on his
civilian employability. Recognizing this, federal law provides for the
valuation of military disability benefits according to the percentage of
disability and the serviceman's rank and longevity at retirement, rather
than at the time of injury."4 6 Thus, it would be reasonable for a dis-
abled serviceman to continue service even beyond the time ordinary
retirement benefits vest, and to expect that his disability-related medi-
cal needs would be sufficiently met by a disability pension which would
begin flowing upon his retirement. 147
In order to determine the husband's civilian employability, it is
necessary to inquire into the nature of his training and his service
before and after the injury. If the husband's injuries rendered his pre-
injury training worthless (a fact testable by comparing his pre-injury
and post-injury duties), making it extremely difficult for him to locate
comparable civilian employment, it would be unfair to penalize him for
not immediately discontinuing military service in order to take advan-
tage of his disability pension rights. The propriety of conditioning a
disabled serviceman's post-dissolution entitlement to a disability pen-
sion on his retirement prior to the time ordinary retirement rights vest
145. The discussion of In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1977), and In re Marriage of Cavnar, 62 Cal. App. 3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976), in
notes 80-97 and the accompanying text supra, illustrates the need to fully analyze the facts in
prior cases, as well as in the case under consideration, and to assess the import of any distin-
guishable facts.
146. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976).
147. But cf. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 14 (1978), where the court held that the husband's continued service well beyond the
date of injury and the measurement of his disability pension according to his rank and
longevity as of the time of retirement were circumstances under which the disability pen-
sion's purpose of providing retirement support outweighed that of compensating the hus-
band for strictly personal losses.
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is especially tenuous where he is injured only shortly before the vesting
of ordinary retirement rights and he is not ready to retire even after
close to twenty years of military service.
The Senquist majority seems to view a disability as lasting only as
long as ordinary retirement rights do not vest, or at least as diminishing
when such retirement rights do vest. The degree to which justice is
achieved under that construction will vary according to the facts of
each case. Because the principles enunciated in Stenquist were not
more clearly defined, the holding, however fair as applied to the parties
in that case, may not be authoritative in other cases. In fact, the Sten-
quist decision may have certain implications in federal constitutional
law particularly with respect to the equal protection of physically hand-
icapped persons. The following section considers some of these consti-
tutional issues.
III. Equal Protection in Disability Pension Cases
A. Equal Protection: A Summary
Equal protection of the laws, guaranteed in both the Fourteenth
Amendment'48 and in other doctrines of the United States Constitution
reflecting the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment, 149 has been de-
scribed as embodying two distinct rights. 50 The first of these, which
Professor Tribe terms the right to equal treatment, 15 guarantees equal-
ity of access to a limited set of interests-rights deemed so fundamental
that they may be abridged only if necessary to promote a "compelling
state interest.' 52 The second protection afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment and related provisions concerns what Tribe calls the right
to treatment as an equal'153 This right guarantees equality with respect
to all interests, requiring the government to treat each individual with
equal regard. Thus, governmental choices which seem to reflect prefer-
ences based on prejudice are subject to special scrutiny and probable
invalidation.
By its own terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the
states. 1 4 Thus, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
148. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in relevant part: "No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 922-93 (1978); Tussman & ten
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rv. 341, 344 n.9 (1949).
150. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 991-94.
151. Id. at 992.
152. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
153. L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 993. See also Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term--
Foreword- Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-11
(1977).
154. The federal government is also bound, under the due process clause of the Fifth
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ment may be invoked to challenge discrimination only where the state
has become signficantly involved in impermissibly unequal treat-
ment.'55 The challenged discrimination is usually legislative, but it
may also be judicial.' 56 In either case, however, "[t]he Constitution
does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be
treated in law as though they were the saine."' 57 Rather, the require-
ment is that "those who are similarly situated be similarly treated."' 58
A governmental classification is legitimate if it treats similarly those
who are similarly situated. Thus, the basic requirement has developed
that governmental classifications be reasonable;"5 9 in order to survive
equal protection scrutiny, the challenged classification must be refera-
ble to a legitimate public purpose based on some conception of the
public good.' 60
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally used a two-
tiered approach when analyzing reasonableness in equal protection
cases.' 6 ' The "lower" tier is characterized by the Court's deferring to
the legislative will; the "higher" tier involves a stricter scrutiny of the
legislative purposes for the classification. The degree of scrutiny trig-
gered is partly dependent upon the type of right burdened by the classi-
fication.' 62 Where the affected right is deemed "fundamental," the
legitimacy of the classification will be examined with "strict scrutiny";
in such cases, the state has the burden of demonstrating that the classi-
fication "is 'tailored' narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that
. . . the 'less drastic means' [have been selected] for effectuating its
objectives." 163 Among the slowly growing catalog of rights deemed
fundamental for equal protection purposes are the First Amendment
rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly;" u the rights
Amendment, to afford equal protection of the laws. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
155. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961). See
also Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 149.
156. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
157. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
158. Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 149, at 344-45. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927); Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
159. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 994-96.
160. See Tussman & ten Broek, supra note 149, at 346.
161. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 996-1002.
162. See id. at 1002-12.
163. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. at 17 (1973) (quoting Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972) and the cases collected therein). See also Kalin v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357-60 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
164. Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis is generally unnecessary to pro-
to interstate travel,165 privacy,1 66 equal voting opportunity, 67 and\ac-
cess to the courts;16 and the rights to procreate 69 and to marry. 70 \
The degree of scrutiny employed is also dependent upon the n -
ture of the class burdened.' 7 ' Thus, governmental action will be strictly
scrutinized where a "discrete and insular minorit[y]' 72 has been "sad-
dled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political-
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process."'' 73 Strict scrutiny triggered by the "sus-
pect class" has thus far been limited to classifications based on race, 171
ancestry,175 and alienage;176 and the continued viability of alienage as a
"suspect" classification is uncertain. 177
The "lower" tier of the two-tiered model mandates "minimal scru-
tiny" where the governmental action infringes no fundamental right-
and involves no suspect classification. In such cases, the governmental
action is presumed valid, and the burden is imposed on the plaintiff to
prove that the discrimination bears no rational relation to a legitimate
tect these explicitly guaranteed rights, and the court normally safeguards them by other
means. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 1005-06.
165. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding the constitutionality of a state statute conditioning petition for
divorce upon satisfaction of a one-year residency requirement).
166. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
167. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). But cf Richard-
son v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (upholding a state's disenfranchisement of convicted
felons).
168. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). But cf. United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upholding a state's filing fee requirement for access to judicial dis-
charge in bankruptcy).
169. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
170. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
171. See L. TmBE, supra note 149, at 1012-82. See also notes 190-200 and accompanying
text infra.
172. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
173. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
174. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). But see Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943).
175. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923). But see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
176. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971). But see also Foley v. Conneie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 (1915).
177. See 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 315, 484-94 (1980), where the author analyzes
Ambach v. Norwick, 439 U.S. 907 (1979), in which the Supreme Court employed minimal
scrutiny under the "rational basis" test to uphold a New York statute forbidding certification
of aliens as public school teachers unless they manifest an intention to apply for citizenship.
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governmental objective. 178 The usual result of applying the "rational-
basis" test is that the discriminatory governmental action is upheld.
1 79
Generally, only when a statute is "underinclusive"' 80 in that it fails to
include all persons similarly situated with respect to the general pur-
pose of the governmental action, or "overinclusive, '"'' in that it affects
a wider range of persons than those whom the law may legitimately
reach, will it be found invalid.
Between the two extremes of minimal scrutiny and strict scrutiny
there has developed in recent years a "middle tier," lending some flex-
ibility to the equal protection standard.182 The Court has flirted with,
but not often applied, intermediate scrutiny where the right at stake,
although not fundamental, is nonetheless so important that interference
with its exercise constitutes either a significant invasion of personal lib-
erty or a denial of a benefit vital to the individual.'8 3 Intermediate re-
view has also been employed, if only in dissenting opinions, for
classifications which, although not "suspect," are nonetheless so sensi-
tive as "to warrant more than casual judicial response."'8 4 Such ele-
vated scrutiny has been applied, in dissenting opinions by some
members of the Supreme Court, to classifications based on illegiti-
macy, 185 age186 and wealth.187 It has become the majority standard in
gender-based discrimination cases.'88
Professor Tribe notes five general techniques by which the Court
may effectuate intermediate review. 8 9 First, the Court may look to the
importance of the governmental objective furthered by the classifica-
tion, relative to the classification's invasion of personal liberty. 90 Sec-
ond, the Court may consider the degree to which the governmental
classification is related to its objectives; such relationship must be "sub-
stantial" to withstand intermediate scrutiny. 191 Third, the Court may
178. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See generally
Note, Developments in the Lan-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-87 (1969).
179. See Gunther, The Supreme Court-Foreword" In Search of Erolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Aodelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I (1972). But see,
e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
180. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974).
181. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
182. The concept of intermediate review may be traced back to Justice Marshall's dissent
in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Gunther, supra note 179.
183. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 149, at 1082-97.
184. Id. at 1090.
185. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 523 (1976) (Stevens. J., dissenting).
186. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976).
187. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970).
188. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
189. See id. at 1082-89.
190. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
191. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201-02 (1976).
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limit its consideration of the classification's rationale to points "cur-
rently articulated" by the party defending the governmental action. 192
Fourth, the Court may exclude the use of "after-the-fact rationaliza-
tions" in defense of the classification, thus limiting justification to con-
siderations that can be shown in fact to have contributed to the
classification's enactment. 9 And finally, where the Court does not
wish to strike down the classification altogether, it may require that the
governmental action be modified so as to permit rebuttal in individual
cases. 1
94
B. Stenquist and Equal Protection
Indiscriminating adherence to In re Marriage of Stenquist 9"
would appear to raise a number of equal protection problems. The
following section inquires first into the level of scrutiny applicable to
cases involving persons in the Stenquist husband's class; once the equal
protection rights of physically handicapped persons are set out, equal
protection doctrine is analyzed with specific reference to Stenquist.
Stenquist's possible incompatibility with certain federal statutory poli-
cies is also discussed. Finally, some suggestions are offered as to the
proper focus of future litigation over community property in disability
pensions.
1. The Physically Handicapped in Constitutional Review
It should first be determined whether classifications which burden
physically handicapped persons warrant strict judicial scrutiny. As dis-
cussed above, strict scrutiny may be invoked where the criteria for clas-
sification are so sensitive as to be considered "suspect," requiring the
state to show a "compelling" governmental objective that cannot be
achieved other than by burdening the suspect class. 196 The Court has
posited a few justifications for treating governmental classifications
based on race, ancestry and alienage as suspect. Perhaps the most
prominent has been the seminal requirement that the burdened group
be a "discrete and insular minorit[y],"' 197 against whom the classifica-
tion "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."'19 8 Thus, the bur-
dened class must be readily identifiable as a politically impotent minor-
ity. The Court further requires that the minority group evoke
192. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640-41 (1974).
193. See id. at 653 (Powell, J., concurring).
194. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976).
195. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
196. See notes 171-76 and accompanying text supra.
197. -United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
198. Id See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973), quoted in text accompanying note 173 supra.
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stereotypes carrying a "stigma of inferiority and a badge of oppro-
brium"; 199 the relative infrequency of such stereotypes would explain
why only a small number of minority groups to date have merited the
protection afforded by strict judicial scrutiny. A final requirement, al-
though less strictly imposed than the first two, is that the condition de-
fining the minority be congenital and immutable. 201
Applying those criteria, it seems clear that physically handicapped
persons do not qualify for treatment as members of a suspect class.2°'
Members of minority races, or of particular alienages or ancestral
groups, are much more readily identified than are members of a class
somewhat sweepingly denominated "physically handicapped.1202 It is
uncertain, for example, how serious a particular handicap would have
to be before an individual would be entitled to special protection; it is
also uncertain what criteria would be used in measuring the seriousness
of specific handicaps. A case can even be made for the proposition that
all persons are handicapped to some extent, thus eliminating the need
for equal protection analysis.
Even if the identity of protected class members could be conclu-
sively established, the required social opprobrium is lacking in the case
of most physically handicapped persons. A handicapped condition
more commonly evokes pity than any "stigma of inferiority." It is
therefore doubtful that the strict scrutiny applied to classifications
based on race, national origin or alienage would be appropriate in the
case of physically handicapped persons. Thus, under current law, the
physically handicapped probably do not qualify for treatment as a sus-
pect class.
Strict scrutiny may also be invoked where a classification impinges
upon a "fundamental right." The fundamental rights most clearly lia-
ble to invasion by state actions burdening the physically handicapped
are the rights to interstate travel20 3 and to equal employment opportu-
nity.2°  Formerly existing inequities have largely been redressed by
199. Note, supra note 178, at 1127. See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 175-76 (1972).
200. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 406 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1972). Note, however, that alienage is not immutable.
201. But see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The QualpFcations of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANhTA
CLARA LAW. 855 (1975).
202. But cf. CAL. VEH. CODE § 22511.5 (West Supp. 1979) (defining with particularity
"physically handicapped" for the purposes of issuing identifying license plates and authoriz-
ing special vehicle parking privileges); 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (defining "handicapped individ-
ual" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Id. § 706(12) (defining "severe
handicap" with particularity for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
203. See note 165 supra.
204. On the right to equal employment opportunity as fundamental, see Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) and Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas,
EQUAL PROTECTION
new legislation designed to safeguard those fundamental rights and
their exercise by physically handicapped persons. In the area of travel,
for example, state and federal legislation has been promulgated to af-
ford physically handicapped persons ready access to airplanes as well
as to public and private buildings.205 Similarly, in the area of equal
employment opportunity, federal and state governments have long pur-
sued broad statutory policies encouraging employment of the physi-
cally handicapped.20 6 Thus, existing legislation and executive
regulations indicate the favorable direction that the law is taking in
order to protect the fundamental rights of the physically handi-
capped. 20 7
Even so, the relatively narrow scope of such legislation may not be
amenable to expansion through the application of "upper-tier" equal
protection analysis. Large differences in the nature and extent of indi-
vidual handicaps, as well as in the qualifications for specific jobs, man-
date a case-by-case approach to claims of employment
discrimination.2 "8 This inability to identify common characteristics
among the physically handicapped would probably preclude strict judi-
cial scrutiny under either a suspect class or a fundamental right ap-
proach.
If resort must therefore be had to the "lower-tier" rational-basis
test, it is virtually certain that the rights of physically handicapped per-
sons will not be broadened. Since a classification is presumed to be
J., dissenting). Denial of this right has recently been held to require more than minimal
scrutiny under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976).
205. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 792, 794; 42 U.S.C. §§ 4151, 4157; 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.571,
121.586, 135.81 (1980); CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 22511.5, -.7, -.8 (West Supp. 1979).
206. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 155; 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-794; 45 C.F.R. §§ 84-85; CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 1412, 1413.1(d), .1(g), 1420(a) (West Supp. 1979). See also Bayh, Foreword to the
Symposium Issue on Employment Rights of the Handicapped, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 943, 949-
52 (1978).
207. See general, Du Bow, Litigaingfor the Rights of Handicapped People, 27 DE PAUL
L. REv. 1101 (1978); Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Contractors, 26
EMORY L.J. 65 (1977); Comment, Ci'ilRights-Handicapped Discrimination, 8 CuM. L. REV.
977 (1977). These policies have been upheld in a number of state and lower federal court
decisions. See, e.g., Barnes v. Converse College, 436 F. Supp. 635 (D.S.C. 1977); Bartels v.
Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972); Bevan v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 74 Misc. 2d 443, 345
N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. 1973) modfled on other grounds, 44 A.D.2d 163, 355 N.Y.S.2d 185
(Sup. Ct. 1974); Milwaukee R.R. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. Labor and Human Relations,
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 938 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1974).
208. Cf. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), where § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 794) was interpreted as allowing professional
schools to impose "reasonable physical qualifications for admission to their clinical training
programs." Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell suggested that determination of
whether such discriminations might be unlawful must proceed on a case-by-case basis. Id.
at 412-13.
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constitutional under this approach, it has been held that the govern-
mental choice must be clearly wrong-not merely as an exercise of
judgment but as an arbitrary display of power-before a governmental
act will be declared invalid.209 Hence, the Court generally utilizes min-
imal scrutiny to uphold governmental classifications. Since legislation
which discriminates against the physically handicapped will usually be
justified as reasonably related to some legitimate governmental objec-
tive,210 application of the rational-basis test is unlikely to further the
rights of handicapped persons.
Although it appears that neither strict nor minimal scrutiny of
governmental activity can be utilized to expand the protection afforded
physically handicapped individuals, the recently developed intermedi-
ate standard of review may prove more successful. As discussed above,
intermediate review may be applied where the discrimination involves
a sensitive, albeit non-suspect class;21' it has been applied most notably
in gender-based discrimination cases. This "middle-tier" approach is
potentially applicable to physically handicapped individuals and, in
particular, to persons situated like the husband in Stenquist.2  An em-
ployee spouse who retires on a disability pension after his or her ordi-
nary retirement rights have already vested may yet have disability-
related medical needs which the pensioner is able to pay for only out of
the disability funds. In such a case the employee spouse's right to equal
protection may protect that spouse from a governmental classification
which fails to distinguish him or her from a similarly situated person
without special needs.
Involved here is a defacto discrimination, a deprivation attributa-
ble to a failure to classify (as distinguished from a dejure discrimina-
tion, a deprivation originating in an affirmative governmental
classification). The United States Supreme Court generally has been
209. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
210. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 12805(e) (West Supp. 1978), denying driving privileges
to any person "unable to operate a motor vehicle upon a highway.., because of any other
disability, disease, or disorder [upon determination] by examination or other evidence."
Clearly, the statute's intent is to promote highway safety, a legitimate governmental interest.
See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(7), excluding aliens "who are certified by the examining surgeon as
having a physical defect, disease, or disability [from admission into the United States] when
determined by the consular or immigration officer to be of such a nature that it may affect
the ability of the alien to earn a living, unless the alien affirmatively establishes that he will
not have to earn a living." In this connection, see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
762 (1972), declaring that unadmitted, nonresident aliens have no constitutional right of
entry into the United States. Enforcement of these policies has prevented the entry into the
United States of many persons suffering from physical defects. See United States ex rel.
Saclarides v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Duner v. Cur-
ran, 10 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 663 (1926); United States exrel. Markin
v. Curran, 9 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 647 (1926).
211. See notes 182-84 and accompanying text supra.
212. 21 Cal. 3d 779, 582 P.2d 96, 148 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978).
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reluctant to redress defacto discriminations not motivated by a dis-
criminatory purpose.2 13 Some justices, however, have argued that the
defjure/defacto distinction should be abandoned as outmoded and es-
sentially incompatible with currently articulated equal protection prin-
ciples.214 Further, some progress recently has been made, at least in
school desegregation cases, toward the disestablishment of the de
jure/defacto dichotomy. In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick215
and Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,1 6 lower court findings of
unconstitutional discriminatory purpose and current discriminatory
impact were not disturbed where based on unrebutted evidence that the
two cities had maintained separate black schools in substantial parts of
their respective school systems. The discriminatory result was held to
constitute prima facie proof of a discriminatory purpose, justifying the
imposition of systemwide busing as a corrective measure. Since the.
requisite discriminatory purpose may be implied, in cases involving ra-
cial inequality, from long-term racial segregation in public education,
and since such discrimination is sufficiently offensive to justify ex-
traordinary remedies such as systemwide busing, a long-term inatten-
tiveness to the needs of the physically handicapped (whether in
education, employment, or any other constitutionally protected area)
arguably merits some corrective action, notwithstanding the defacto
context in which the latter discrimination may be evidenced.
Analogy to cases adjudicating the equal protection rights of racial
minorities is helpful not only because such cases have, in fact, been the
first to address the matter of defacto discrimination, but also because
the Court's development of equal protection analysis has historically
proceeded from the constitutional mandate to protect racial minorities,
especially blacks. 2 7 This is not to say, however, that the benefits of
equal protection may be afforded to a particular group only upon a
213. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S.
189 (1973).
214. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 214-17 (Douglas, J., concurring).
215. 443 U.S. 449 (1979). This case is discussed in 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315, 505-22
(1980).
216. 443 U.S. 526 (1979). This case is discussed in 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315, 505-22
(1980).
217. In the years immediately following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
judicial application of the equal protection clause was limited to the protection of blacks.
See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). A few years later, the equal protec-
tion clause was invoked to afford protection also to alien members of other racial minorities.
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Gradually, and most notably under the
Warren Court, the concept of equal protection was expanded to invalidate not only "sus-
pect" classifications burdening certain minorities irrespective of their racial affiliations, but
governmental intrusions upon certain "fundamental rights" as well. See notes 161-77 and
accompanying text supra.
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showing that that group is situated similarly to a racial minority.2"'
The core of the equal protection.clause is not a constitutional mandate
to protect blacks and other racial minorities, although that was the
Fourteenth Amendment's historical purpose and remains its most im-
portant function in practice. Rather, the concept of equal protection as
currently embodied in American constitutional law serves the more far-
reaching purpose of assuring the dignity of full membership in society
to each individual separately, such that society is precluded from
arbitarily excluding any single individual from the responsibilities
which it delegates or the benefits which it confers.21 9 If this is accepted
as the function of the equal protection clause, the de jure/defacto dis-
tinction ceases to be a logical element in the redress of discriminations
burdening the physically handicapped either as individuals or as a
group. This is true notwithstanding the Court's refusal to treat the
group as a suspect class.
Substantial governmental intrusion upon protected rights, whether
or not "fundamental," and whether or not motivated by a discrimina-
tory purpose, would seem equally intolerable for similar reasons. Leg-
islative or judicial classifications that deprive physically handicapped
individuals of property solely because they have chosen to continue
employment beyond the moment when their ordinary pensions vested
tend to penalize handicapped employees for exercising a constitution-
ally protected right to equal employment opportunity. The fact that
the classification operates as a penalty, depriving the handicapped indi-
vidual of sorely-needed pension benefits, is especially obvious where
the disabled pensioner can demonstrate a special need for the confis-
cated property, deriving from his handicapped status. Visiting such a
forefeiture upon a handicapped person seems to violate the spirit, if not
the overly mechanistic letter, of the equal protection clause.
218. Recent limitation of the benefits of the equal protection clause to racial minorities
has, to date, been a hallmark only of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinions. See, e.g.,
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Encroachment
upon the status of aliens as a suspect class, however, has recently been evidenced in Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978), and in Ambach v. Norwick, 439 U.S. 907 (1979), giving rise
to the possibility that further equal protection limitations, affecting other protected groups as
well as the exercise of fundamental rights, are forthcoming.
219. Thus, Professor Karst has argued for a concept of "equal citizenship" as constituting
the substantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause. See Karst,
supra note 158, at 38-68. Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
quoted in Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977): "Due process has not been
reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined by reference to any code. The best
that can be said is that through the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual,
has struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society." Id. at 501.
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2. Constitutional Issues in Stenquist
In referring solely to the moment of vesting in order to determine
the divisibility of a disability pension,22° the Stenquist majority penal-
ized the disabled employee spouse for working beyond that moment;
thus, the Stenquist holding may, in effect, interfere with the exercise of
an important constitutionally protected right, the right to equal em-
ployment opportunity. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,22" ' this right
was characterized as sufficiently important to warrant more than mini-
mal scrutiny of governmental classifications burdening its exercise.222
Hampton provides a convenient blueprint for analyzing governmental
actions which allegedly infringe the right to equal employment oppor-
tunity. The Hampton Court examined (1) the nature of the group bur-
dened,22 3 (2) the breadth of the infringement, 224 (3) the proposed ra-
tionale for the governmental action,225 and (4) the availability of less
restrictive alternatives.226
This analytical framework may be readily applied to the holding
in Stenquist. There, the group burdened is composed of married per-
sons whose work-related disabilities, while not necessitating immediate
retirement, qualify such persons for disability pensions; thus, Stenquist
adversely affects a readily-identifiable subgroup of physically handi-
capped persons. As in Hampton, members of this class are "already
subject to disadvantages not shared by the remainder of the commu-
nity.' ' 227 These disadvantages have been noticed at both the federal
and state levels; special legislative, regulatory and judicial remedies
have been devised in partial compensation. 228
Additionally, as in Hampton, "the added disadvantage resulting
from the enforcement of the rule. . . is of sufficient significance to be
characterized as a deprivation of an interest in liberty. ' 22 9 Although
Stenquist does not explicitly deprive disabled employee spouses of em-
ployment once secured, and does not forbid them from working be-
yond the moment that ordinary retirement rights vest, the Stenquist
holding does render continued employment beyond that moment sig-
220. See In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 788, 582 P.2d at 102, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
15 (1978).
221. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
222. See id. at 102-03. See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915); Barsky v. Board
of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Hampton was decided on the
basis of the Fifth Amendment due process clause, since a federal regulation was involved.
223. 426 U.S. at 102-03.
224. Id. at 100-01, 115-16.
225. Id. at 104-16.
226. Id. at 114-16.
227. Id. at 102.
228. See notes 205-07 and accompanying text supra.
229. 426 U.S. at 102.
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nificantly less attractive than it might otherwise be; this is especially
true where dissolution precedes retirement. Stenquist offers non-em-
ployee spouses the unconditional right to be awarded a one-half inter-
est not only in post-dissolution disability receipts attributable to post-
vesting employment, but in receipts attributable to employment prior
to vesting as well. To a certain extent, inequitable results which burden
disabled persons having demonstrated needs for greater portions of
their disability pensions will be mitigated by the new statutory scheme
setting forth rules for the classification and distribution of personal in-
jury damages.230 However, the neW statute does not explicitly mandate
comparable treatment for disability pensions per se. Although the
courts traditionally have treated such pensions as though they repre-
sented personal injury damage awards, nothing in the California com-
munity property regime forbids the abandonment of that practice, and
Stenquist may continue to control in future cases involving property
rights in disability pensions. Even if the new statutes are held to con-
trol in the disability pension area, those statutes may be interpreted as
implicitly sanctioning the Stenquist approach to these problems, at least
insofar as the courts are permitted to consider "the time that has
elapsed since the ...accrual of the cause of action."' 23' Substitute
"entitlement to the disability pension" for "accrual of the cause of ac-
tion," and the moment at which ordinary retirement rights vest regains
all its lost lustre. Most notable of all, perhaps, is the current judicial
practice of offsetting unequal divisions of one community asset with
proportionately unequal divisions of other such assets.232 If this prac-
tice is applied in cases which involve the division and distribution of
disability pensions, it will be all too easy to frustrate the equitable prac-
tices contemplated by the new statutes.
Disabled employee spouses in California must therefore be pre-
pared either to retire on their disability pensions before their ordinary
retirement rights vest, or to face the possibility of having to part with
one-half of all vested pension receipts not attributable to employment
as a single person even in dissolutions which precede retirement. To
the extent that this constitutes a significant disincentive for disabled
persons to continue working, it may also significantly infringe upon
their right to equal employment opportunity. The deprivation will be
especially marked where disabled employees are encouraged thereby to
retire before ordinary rights vest, and so to forego all opportunities of
continued employment (including, as a practical matter, employment
under new employers) owing to their disabilities.3
230. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
231. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(c) (West Supp. 1980).
232. See In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809
(1974).
233. There is now reason to doubt that even a disabled employee spouse who retires
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The proposed reasons for this rule are unpersuasive. The Sten-
quist Court noted that the husband did not retire prematurely to face
the prospect of competing on the civilian job market at a disadvantage,
that he did not begin receiving his pension until seventeen years after
his injury, and that the value of his pension was determined partly by
longevity of service at retirement rather than at the time of injury.
Under these circumstances, the court held that the pension's primary
function was to provide retirement support.234 As argued earlier, how-
ever, it cannot be assumed that this analysis will be appropriate in all
cases having Stenquist-type facts." 5 The court further justified its
holding as avoiding "complications" by means of a "simple mathemati-
cal computation. 2 36 But "administrative convenience," as this ration-
ale is more commonly called, was held in Hampton to justify intrusions
on the right to equal employment opportunity only where not out-
weighed by public interest considerations. 237 The public has a clear
interest in the equitable division of marital assets at dissolution; but
nothing in the Stenquist opinion suggests that the formula approved in
that case will achieve substantial justice in cases where the handi-
capped employee is able to demonstrate a special need for a greater
part of his or her disability pension than Stenquist would afford. Fur-
ther, Stenquist's apparent incompatibility with certain federal policies
regarding military disability pensions," as well as the civil rights of
the physically handicapped in general," 9 casts considerable doubt on
whether the court's formula serves the public interest at all. Indeed,
none of the proposed reasons for the holding in Stenquist justifies the
discrimination which may result in factually distinguishable situations.
Finally, less restrictive alternatives are available to accomplish the
Stenquist Court's desired objective. As shown above, more equitable
formulas which take into account a number of relevant factors may be
utilized.240 Application of such formulas may result in only a portion
of the pension being awarded to the non-employee spouse; if none of it
before ordinary retirement rights vest will be able to escape the spirit of Stenquist. In In re
Marriage of Samuels, 96 Cal. App. 3d 122, 158 Cal. Rptr,38 (1979), the court of appeals
held that disability payments received after ordinary retirement age is reached constitute
community property, even where the pensioner retires before that time due to his or her
disability.
234. See In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
14.
235. See notes 133-37 and accompanying text supra.
236. In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. at 785 n.4, 582 P.2d at 99 n.4, 148 Cal. Rptr. at
12 n.4.
237. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 115-16 (1976).
238. See notes 100-04 and accompanying text supra.
239. Some of the federal policies regarding the physically handicapped are mentioned in
notes 205-07 and the accompanying text supra.
240. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text supra.
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is, the court may still award support to the nonemployee spouse in or-
der to provide for his or her financial needs.241 In sum, because the
holding in Stenquist may, in certain situations, effectively burden a
physically handicapped individual's right to equal employment oppor-
tunity, it is subject to an equal protection challenge. The United States
Supreme Court's decision in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wiong2 42 indicates
that an intermediate standard of review should be applied to classifica-
tions which burden this right. 43 Analyzing the Stenquist rule accord-
ing to the Hampton mode of inquiry demonstrates that that rule, when
applied to S/enquist-like fact situations, may violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. Conclusions
Which constitutional alternative is best suited to cases involving
persons situated similarly to the Stenquist husband? If the essential
fairness of dividing a disability pension one-half between the spouses
in such a case depends on factors not considered in Stenquist, the dis-
abled employee spouse should be given the opportunity to exempt him-
self or herself from that holding. The Stenquist rule might therefore be
enforced in proper instances, but individuals potentially subject to the
rule should be afforded an opportunity to rebut the presumption that
their cases fall within its purview. Permitting rebuttal-thereby trans-
forming irrebuttable presumptions into burden-shifting devices-has
been a favored remedy in equal protection cases involving classifica-
tions subject to intermediate review.2' This practice would be espe-
cially appropriate in determining the property rights of disabled
spouses with respect to their disability pensions, and may be mandated
in any event by the new statutes, if they are held to be controlling in
pension cases. Since a disability pension may serve different functions
under different circumstances,24 the problem of classification should
not be treated as one requiring a single solution for all cases. The inter-
mediate remedy of a rebuttable presumption would accord equality of
treatment to both spouses, without frustrating any established federal
241. See In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d at 795-96, 582 P.2d at 106-07, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 19-20 (Clark, J., dissenting).
242. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
243. See note 222 and accompanying text supra.
244. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-71 (1977), where the Court required
a similar middle ground approach between an absolute rule and a case-by-case determina-
tion. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S.
89, 96 (1965); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concur-
ring). But cf. Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 1534 (1974) (arguing that the doctrine is confused and unhelpful).
245. See notes 64-99 and accompanying text supra See also 21 Cal. 3d at 787, 582 P.2d
at 101, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 14.
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or state policy.24 6 The employee spouse's status as a physically handi-
capped individual would be respected and protected, as would the non -
employee spouse's marital property rights in ordinary retiremenk
benefits.
Under current California law, marital property rights bow to the
equal protection rights of the physically handicapped until such time as
ordinary retirement rights vest; at that moment, the tables immediately
turn, and marital property rights outweigh the equal protection rights
of disabled pensioners. Under the suggested approach, both sets of
rights would receive the same consideration under all circumstances,
obviating the need for a hierarchy of protection dependent upoll4the
moment of vesting-an arbitrarily chosen moment, at best. Moreover,
the suggested approach is compatible not only with existing federal
policies regarding military disability pensions and the physically handi-
capped in general,247 but also with California community property
principles, since all apportionments and distributions must be consis-
tent with the interests of justice, according to all the circumstances of a
given case.2 4 8 Adoption of this approach would not require that any
prior California case be overruled, as none presents a problem similar
to that posed in Stenquist.49 Thus, the Stenquist rule could be fol-
lowed in those cases where the employee spouse, like the husband in
Stenquist, has no special need for the entire disability pension, and dis-
tinguished in situations where such a need is shown.
246. As discussed earlier, the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, requires that federal policy not be frustrated by state community prop-
erty law. See notes 105-130 and accompanying text supra.
247. See notes 105-30 and 205-07 and accompanying text supra.
248. See note 140 and accompanying text supra.
249. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mueller, 70 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1977);
In re Marriage of Cavnar, 62 Cal. App. 3d 660, 133 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1976); In re Marriage of
Jones, 13 Cal. 3d 457, 531 P.2d 420, 119 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975). For a discussion of these
cases and a comparison of each with Stenquist, see notes 66-97 and accompanying text
supra.
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